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The debt review procedure in terms of the National Credit Act 34 
of 2005 is functioning relatively well and benefits both 
consumers and credit providers. This is despite its somewhat 
scarce procedural prescriptions, which result in difficulties from 
time to time. In this respect, a recent procedural challenge has 
appeared, namely that of consumers who voluntary enter the 
debt procedure, but who later want to withdraw therefrom – thus, 
before the procedure has reached its ordinary conclusion, on the 
basis that their financial situation has improved to the extent that 
they are no longer over-indebted. The fact that the National 
Credit Act does not provide for such an exit has led to procedural 
uncertainty and diverging court decisions. In this article, the 
relevant legislative provisions (or lack thereof), court and 
National Consumer Tribunal judgements, regulations, forms, 
guidelines and explanatory notes are considered to determine 
whether it is competent for consumers to withdraw from the debt 
review procedure before it has reached its normal conclusion. 
Not only provisions in the National Credit Act are considered, but 
also general civil procedure to contemplate all possibilities in 
searching for an answer to this procedural difficulty. 
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1  Introduction 
One of the hallmarks of the National Credit Act1 is the dedicated debt relief 
measures it has introduced for South African consumers. Notably, the Act 
has become the first piece of credit legislation that has introduced 
comprehensive provisions (in Part D of Chapter 4) aimed at preventing the 
extension of reckless credit and alleviating consumer over-indebtedness. A 
consumer is over-indebted for the purposes of the NCA,2 
if the preponderance of available information at the time that a determination 
is made indicates that the particular consumer is or will be unable to satisfy in 
a timely manner all the obligations under all the credit agreements to which 
the consumer is a party, having regard to that consumer's  
(a) financial means, prospects and obligations; and 
(b) probable propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations 
under all the credit agreements to which the consumer is a party, as 
indicated by the consumer's history of debt repayment. 
Specifically in the context of assisting over-indebted natural person 
consumers, the NCA has introduced the novel procedure of debt review, 
which is a process aimed at reviewing the consumer's financial situation 
conducted by a person registered as a debt-counsellor under the Act.3 The 
purpose of such debt review is, briefly put, to determine whether the 
consumer is indeed over-indebted and to have his credit agreement debt 
restructured by a court with the aim of providing debt alleviation, while also 
                                            
*  Corlia M van Heerden. B Proc (UP) LLB (UP) LLM (Unisa) LLM (UP) LLD (RAU). 
Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa. E-
mail: corlia.vanheerden@up.ac.za. 
**  Hermie Coetzee. BCom Law (UP) LLB (UP) LLM (UP) LLD (UP). Associate 
Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa. E-
mail: hermie.coetzee@up.ac.za. 
1  National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (hereafter the NCA or the Act). 
2  Section 79 of the NCA. S 78(3) provides that "financial means, prospects and 
obligations" for the purposes of Part D of Chapter 4 "with respect to a consumer or 
prospective consumer, includes – (a) income, or any right to receive income, 
regardless of the source, frequency or regularity of that income, other than income 
that the consumer or prospective consumer receives, has a right to receive, or holds 
in trust for another person; (b) the financial means, prospects and obligations of any 
other adult person within the consumer's immediate family or household, to the 
extent that the consumer, or prospective consumer, and that other person 
customarily- (i) share their respective financial means: and (ii) mutually bear their 
respective financial obligations; and (c) if the consumer has or had a commercial 
purpose for applying for or entering into a particular credit agreement, the reasonably 
estimated future revenue flow from that business purpose." 
3  See ss 85, 86, 87 and 88 of the Act regarding debt review and ss 43 and 44 regarding 
the office of debt counsellor. 
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generally ensuring that the consumer attends to the eventual satisfaction of 
his credit agreement debt.4 
While there was initial scepticism about the viability and soundness of the 
debt review process and although (from a procedural perspective) there 
were various challenges in streamlining the process, it can be concluded 
that the debt review process in general seems to be working relatively well, 
has assisted many consumers in addressing their debt burden, and has led 
to sizeable collections on behalf of creditors every month.5 However, a new 
procedural challenge has surfaced in recent times, namely that of over-
indebted consumers who enter the debt review process to obtain debt relief 
only to find, after some time, that they are actually shackled by some of the 
constraints of the process and want to exit the process but are unable to do 
so. 
The purpose of this contribution is to briefly consider the debt review 
process and the effect of debt review on the consumer. Specific 
consideration is given to the processes the NCA avails to consumers to exit 
the debt review process. Recent case law that reveals challenges 
experienced by consumers in exiting the debt review process, particularly 
those consumers who allege that their financial position has improved and 
that they are no longer over-indebted, is considered and recommendations 
are made regarding how to address the problem at hand. It is to be noted 
that this discussion deals only with voluntary debt review in terms of section 
86 of the NCA and not with court-ordered debt review in terms of section 85 
or with the debt intervention procedure introduced by the 2019 National 
Credit Amendment Act.6 Also, it does not deal with the withdrawal by a debt 
counsellor from debt review or with the termination of debt review by a credit 
                                            
4  Sections 85-87 read with s 3(d) of the Act. Also see Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd v Newman (WC) (unreported) case number 27771/2010 of 15 April 2011 para 
11; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Jikeka (WCC) (unreported) case number 3430/2010 
of 9 June 2011 paras 3-4; Absa Bank Ltd v Walker (WC) (unreported) case number 
2307/14 of 17 June 2014. 
5   See Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless Lending" para 11.3.3.2(m) for 
an overview of the initial procedural challenges posed by the debt review process. 
Also see National Credit Regulator v Nedbank Ltd 2009 6 SA 295 (GNP) (hereafter 
the National Credit Regulator v Nedbank (GNP) case); Nedbank Ltd v National 
Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) (hereafter the Nedbank v National Credit 
Regulator (SCA) case). In NCR 2017/2018 
https://ncr.org.za/documents/pages/Annual%20Reports/NCR%20Annual%20Repor
t%202017-18.pdf the National Credit Regulator (NCR) indicated that there were 1 
325 registered debt counsellors and that in the period under review (2017/2018) 
R10.16 billion were collected for credit providers via debt counselling bringing the 
total amount collected, since the inception of the debt counselling process in 2007, 
to R44.28 billion.  
6  National Credit Amendment Act 7 of 2019 (hereafter 2019 Amendment Act). 
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provider, save to mention these measures where necessary for the 
purposes of context. 
2  Overview of the debt review process 
2.1  Background 
To contextualise the discussion that follows, some observations regarding 
the voluntary debt review process, in terms of section 86 read with 
regulation 24,7 is necessary. At the outset, it is important to bear in mind 
what the legislature sought to achieve with the introduction of voluntary debt 
review as this, interpreted against the purposes of the NCA, will serve as 
the prism through which to view the main question of whether consumers 
should be allowed to exit a debt review before the debt review process has 
been finalised and they have complied with the requirements for a clearance 
certificate as discussed below.  
Section 3 of the NCA states that the purposes of the Act  
… are to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, 
efficient, effective and accessible credit market and industry, and to protect 
consumers. 
This is done by means of various measures listed in section 3, which among 
others include8  
… promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South 
Africans,9 … promoting responsibility in the credit market by (i) encouraging 
responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness and fulfilment of 
financial obligations by consumers;10 … promoting equity in the credit market 
by balancing the respective rights and responsibilities of credit providers and 
consumers … 
and11 
… addressing and resolving over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing 
mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of 
satisfaction by the consumer of all responsible financial obligations. 
In the Memorandum on the Objects on the National Credit Bill 2005 it was 
indicated that the focus of the legislation should be shifted from price control 
to protection against over-indebtedness and to the regulation of predatory 
                                            
7  GN R489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 2006 as amended (hereinafter the regulations). 
8  Section 3(d) of the Act. 
9  Section 3(a) of the Act. 
10  Section 3(c)(i) of the Act. 
11  Section 3(g) of the Act. 
CM VAN HEERDEN & H COETZEE PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 5 
 
lending practices.12 To give effect to the NCA's consumer protection 
purpose of addressing and resolving over-indebtedness, as stated in 
section 3(g), the debt review process was introduced, which provides for 
debt re-organisation in cases of over-indebtedness.13 However, the Act 
does not strive to address over-indebtedness by providing a discharge of 
debt to over-indebted consumers. In this regard the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Collett v FirstRand Bank Ltd stated that:14 
The purpose of the debt review is not to relieve the consumer of his 
obligations, but to achieve either a voluntary debt re-arrangement or a debt 
re-arrangement by the magistrates' (sic) court. 
2.2  Debt review in terms of section 86 
In terms of section 86 of the NCA, a natural person consumer who is 
experiencing difficulty or inability in paying his credit agreement debt can 
voluntarily apply to a debt counsellor for debt review.15 All parties to the debt 
review process (consumer, credit provider and debt counsellor) must 
participate in the process in good faith.16 The debt counsellor is obliged17 to 
make a determination of whether the consumer is over-indebted or likely to 
become over-indebted or not over-indebted.18 If the debt counsellor finds 
the consumer not to be over-indebted (which is highly unlikely) the 
consumer is at liberty to approach a court on application to pronounce on 
whether the consumer is over-indebted or not.19 If the debt counsellor 
determines that the consumer is not over-indebted but likely to become 
over-indebted, the debt counsellor may submit a debt restructuring proposal 
to the consumer's credit providers.20 If all the credit providers agree to the 
                                            
12  Memorandum on the Objects of the National Credit Bill, 2005 3. 
13  See the preamble to the NCA. Also see FirstRand Bank Ltd v Olivier 2009 3 SA 353 
(SE) 357 and Otto 2009 SA Merc LJ 272 for a discussion of the case. See further 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Panayiotts 2009 3 SA 363 (W) 375. 
14  Collett v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2011 4 SA 508 (SCA) 514. Also see Ex parte Ford 2009 
3 SA 376 (WCC) 383. 
15  Section 86(1) of the Act. 
16  Section 86(5) of the Act. Also see the discussion on good faith in debt review 
proceedings by Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and Reckless Lending" para 11.3 
and the cases cited there. 
17  Section 86(7)(a) and s 86(9) of the Act read with reg 25 and reg 26 and s 88(1)(a) 
and (b). 
18  Section 86(6) of the Act. 
19  Section 86(9) of the Act read with reg 26 and Form 18. Also see s 88(1)(a) and (b). 
Notably the court, in terms of s 88(1)(b), can make an order declaring a consumer 
not over-indebted where the consumer approaches a court for a declaration of over-
indebtedness or where the debt counsellor after making a determination in terms of 
s 86(6) refers a matter to court for a declaration of over-indebtedness and debt 
restructuring. 
20  Although s 86(6) of the Act indicates that the debt counsellor can approach the 
creditors with such a proposal, if the consumer is not yet over-indebted but 
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proposal it is referred to court to be made a consent order.21 If not all the 
credit providers agree, the proposal has to be referred to court with a 
"recommendation" that the court formally declare the consumer over-
indebted and restructure his debt in accordance with the repayment 
proposal.22 In practice, such a debt restructuring proposal is also made to 
the credit providers of a consumer where the debt counsellor determines 
that the consumer is indeed over-indebted and, if not agreed to by all the 
credit providers, the proposal must be referred to court in accordance with 
section 86(7)(c). 
Thus, the "debt review process" has three distinct stages, namely the stage 
where the debt counsellor interrogates the consumer's financial situation to 
determine whether he is over-indebted or not; the stage where the 
application for a debt restructuring order (or for making a rearrangement 
agreement a consent order) is heard by the court; and the stage after the 
court has made a debt restructuring order, when the consumer is obliged to 
make payments in accordance with the debt restructuring order.  
It is important to note that the debt counsellor does not have any power to 
"declare" a consumer over-indebted, but is merely obliged to make a 
"determination" regarding the consumer's over-indebtedness and to refer it 
to the court with a recommendation (a proposal) on how the debt should be 
restructured. It is then the task of the court to conduct a hearing and formally 
declare the consumer over-indebted and afford him debt relief by 
restructuring his credit agreement debt (unless a debt rearrangement order 
is made by consent as contemplated in section 86(8)(a) read with section 
138, in which event a full hearing is not conducted).23 The court that is 
approached for such debt restructuring will be a Magistrate's Court and it is 
to be noted that the court is not obliged to declare the consumer over-
indebted and make a restructuring order, but that it has a discretion – to be 
                                            
nevertheless experiencing or likely to experience problems in future to repay his 
credit agreement debt, it has become practice for debt counsellors to always first 
present the debt restructuring proposal to the consumer's credit providers with the 
aim of reaching agreement thereon. 
21  Section 86(8)(b) read with s 87 of the Act and s 138. Reg 24(9) stipulates that any 
arrangement made by the debt counsellor with credit providers must be reduced to 
writing and signed by all credit providers mentioned, as well as by the debt counsellor 
and the consumer. Also see Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator (SCA) para 
29. 
22  Section 86(7)(c) of the Act. 
23  Section 87 of the Act. For a detailed discussion of all aspects of the debt review 
process and applicable case law see Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and 
Reckless Lending" paras 11.3-11.5. 
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exercised judicially – to do so.24 Section 88(1)(b) confirms that a court is not 
obliged to declare a consumer over-indebted and can also declare a 
consumer "not over-indebted" if it appears from the facts presented to the 
court (either by the consumer himself in terms of section 86(9) or via a 
restructuring application in terms of section 86(7)(c)) that the consumer is 
indeed not over-indebted as contemplated by section 79 of the NCA. The 
Magistrate's Court's jurisdiction in the context of debt restructuring further 
entails that even where, after a hearing, a court is satisfied that the 
consumer is indeed over-indebted, it still has the discretion as to whether to 
grant a debt restructuring on the terms proposed by the debt counsellor or 
on other (more appropriate) terms, or the court may even reject the proposal 
if it is not financially viable.25  
It is to be noted that the Act does not prescribe a specific time period within 
which the debt review process, comprising the three stages referred to 
above, must be finalised. Generally, the initial process before the debt 
counsellor should be finished within 60 days from the date of the debt review 
application, at which stage the matter should be referred to court – either for 
a consent order or for the court to consider and grant a debt restructuring 
order.26 Depending on the nature and amount of the credit agreement debt, 
the court can declare the consumer over-indebted and a debt restructuring 
order (either by consent or pursuant to a recommendation in terms of 
section 86(7)) as alluded to above can be issued for the repayment of the 
debt over a period as agreed between the consumer and his credit providers 
or as otherwise ordered by the court. This period can range from a couple 
of months to a couple of years.27  
In Nedbank v National Credit Regulator28 it was held that a debt counsellor 
as a statutory functionary is obliged, consequent to reviewing a consumer's 
debt in terms of section 86, to refer a proposal to the Magistrate's Court to 
make certain orders, failing which he has not complied with his duty as a 
debt counsellor. However, in practice it appears that some debt counsellors 
enter into voluntary debt rearrangement agreements on behalf of the 
                                            
24  National Credit Regulator v Nedbank (GNP) case. 
25  Section 86(7)(c) read with s 88(1)(b) of the Act. 
26   Where a debt review application before a debt counsellor exceeds such a time 
period, without having been referred to court, a credit provider may terminate the 
debt review process in accordance with s 86(10) of the Act. Provision is also made 
in s 86(11) for a terminated debt review to resume on any conditions that an 
enforcement court deems just. 
27  See the "Repayment Term Extension Limits" in Annexure D to NCR 2015 
https://ncr.org.za/documents/pages/circulars/jan2015/Debt%20Review%20Task%2
0Team%20Agreements.pdf. 
28  Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator (SCA). 
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consumer without referring the matter to court for a consent order, and that 
the consumer then continues to pay in terms of that informal voluntary 
arrangement.29  
Applying for debt review in terms of section 86 has a number of 
consequences: a Form 17.130 must be sent out, which informs the credit 
providers of the application for debt review, and the consumer's name gets 
listed with credit bureaus when the debt counsellor accepts his debt review 
application.31 After the determination regarding the consumer's state of 
indebtedness is completed, a Form 17.2 is sent out to credit providers and 
credit bureaus, updating them on the progress with the debt review.32 Once 
the consumer's initial application for debt review is received by the debt 
counsellor, a moratorium on the enforcement of the agreement through a 
judicial process kicks in by virtue of the provisions of section 88(3) read with 
section 86(4)(b)(i) and Form 17.1 of the Act.33 This moratorium continues to 
apply when the debt counsellor, as he is supposed to do, refers a debt 
rearrangement proposal to court and the court subsequently makes a 
restructuring/rearrangement order. When such an order is made, the 
moratorium remains in place as long as the consumer continues to pay in 
                                            
29  See the cases discussed in 7 below for examples. 
30  Form 17.1 advises the credit providers that the consumer has applied for debt review 
and requires the credit providers, within 5 days of receipt of the said form, to list the 
consumer as having applied for debt review. 
31  Section 86(4)(b) of the Act provides that "on receipt of an application for debt review 
the debt counsellor must- (a) provide the consumer with proof of receipt of the 
application; (b) notify, in the prescribed manner and form- (i) all credit providers that 
are listed in the application; and (ii) every registered credit bureau." 
32  Form 17.2 is a form that advises the credit providers and credit bureaus that 
 a. the consumer's debt review application was rejected; or 
 b. the consumer's application for debt review was successful and his debt obligations 
are in the process of being restructured; or 
 c. his debt obligations have been restructured and a court/Tribunal order has been 
issued in a specific magistrates court. 
33  Section 88(3) of the Act provides that "[s]ubject to section 86(9) and (10), a credit 
provider who receives notice of court proceedings contemplated in section 83 or 85, 
or notice in terms of section 86(4)(b)(i), may not exercise or enforce by litigation or 
other judicial process any right or security under that credit agreement until- (a) the 
consumer is in default under the credit agreement; and (b) one of the following has 
occurred: (i) An event contemplated in subsection (1)(a) through (c); or (ii) the 
consumer defaults on any obligation in terms of a debt re-arrangement agreed 
between the consumer and credit providers, or ordered by a court or the Tribunal" 
(Emphasis added). It should be noted that at first glance, s 88(3)(b)(ii) appears to 
create the impression that a debt rearrangement between the consumer and his 
credit providers need not be formalised by a court order. However, it is clear from s 
86(7)(b) read with s 138 of the Act that such an agreement has to be formalised as 
a consent order and that this is the interpretation that should also be afforded to s 
88(3)(b)(ii). The legislature probably wants only to distinguish between voluntary 
debt rearrangements as per s 86(7)(b) and court ordered rearrangements as per s 
86(7)(c). 
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accordance with the debt restructuring order.34 The idea is that the over-
indebted consumer is afforded some "breathing space" to repay his credit 
agreement debt over a longer period and on other terms than originally 
dictated by the credit agreement between the parties, without having to 
worry that his credit providers will institute debt enforcement proceedings. 
However, the debt review process does not offer any discharge of the 
consumer's credit agreement debt, because it is a measure that seeks to 
enable him to eventually repay all such credit agreement debt.35  
The fact that credit providers are notified when a consumer applies to a debt 
counsellor ensures that the credit providers observe the moratorium on 
enforcement imposed by section 88(3) and the consumer is protected 
against debt enforcement pertaining to the agreements that are being 
reviewed. However, the purpose of debt review will be frustrated if the 
consumer is allowed to carry on concluding new (reckless) credit 
agreements that can aggravate his over-indebtedness. Consequently, while 
the consumer is under debt review before the debt counsellor and also later 
when he is subject to a debt restructuring order, section 88(1) forbids him 
from entering into any new credit agreements.36 This bar against taking up 
new credit kicks in when the consumer "has filed an application in terms of 
section 86(1)", which can be construed to mean that it applies from the 
moment that the consumer files his application for debt review with the debt 
counsellor and thus even before the Form 17.1 notice is sent out to the credit 
providers and credit bureaus. 
The NCA further provides that a consumer who entered the debt review 
process and whose debts have been successfully "re-arranged" 
                                            
34  Section 88(1) and (3) of the Act. 
35  Section 3(g) of the Act. Also see Otto 2010 TSAR 399; Boraine, Van Heerden and 
Roestoff 2012 De Jure 102. 
36  Section 88(1) of the Act provides that "[a] consumer who has filed an application in 
terms of section 86(1), or who has alleged in a court that the consumer is over-
indebted, must not incur any further charges under a credit facility or enter into any 
further credit agreement, other than a consolidation agreement, with any credit 
provider until one of the following events has occurred: (a) The debt counsellor 
rejects the application and the prescribed time period for direct filing in terms of 
section 86(9) has expired without the consumer having so applied; (b) the court has 
determined that the consumer is not over-indebted, or has rejected a debt 
counsellor's proposal or the consumer's application; or (c) a court having made an 
order or the consumer and credit providers having made an agreement re-arranging 
the consumer's obligations, all the consumer's obligations under the credit 
agreement as re-arranged are fulfilled, unless the consumer fulfilled the obligations 
by way of a consolidation agreement". If the consumer does manage to enter into 
such new credit agreement whilst being under debt review, s 88(4) provides that he 
will not be able to later raise the argument that the new credit was extended to him 
recklessly. 
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(restructured) in terms of Part D of Chapter 4 can be granted a clearance 
certificate in certain circumstances as discussed below. Such a certificate 
then serves to facilitate the consumer's exit from the "completed" debt 
review process.  
3  Clearance certificate 
3.1  Provisions of section 71 prior to amendment by the National 
Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 
Initially, section 71(1) provided that a consumer whose debts had been 
rearranged under Part D of Chapter 4 of the NCA could apply to a debt 
counsellor for a "clearance certificate".37 It was required that a debt 
counsellor who received an application for a clearance certificate had to 
investigate the circumstances of the particular debt rearrangement. The 
debt counsellor was then required to issue a clearance certificate in the 
prescribed form38 if the consumer had fully satisfied all the obligations under 
every credit agreement that was subject to the debt rearrangement order or 
agreement, in accordance with that order or agreement.39 If this condition 
was not met, the debt counsellor was obliged to refuse to issue a clearance 
certificate.40  
If the debt counsellor refused to issue a clearance certificate, where the 
conditions for such a certificate had been met, the consumer could apply to 
the National Consumer Tribunal41 to review the debt counsellor's decision. 
If satisfied that the consumer was entitled to such an order, the Tribunal 
could order the debt counsellor to issue a clearance certificate to the 
consumer.42 The consumer who obtained a clearance certificate could then 
file a certified copy of such a certificate with the national credit register43 or 
                                            
37  The concept "clearance certificate" is not defined in the Act or Regulations. 
38  Form 19 as prescribed in the Regulations. Form 19 is a standard form certifying that 
the consumer has discharged all his obligations in terms of the debt re-arrangement 
order granted by the court and listing the specific debts that were included under the 
rearrangement order and which have been settled in full. 
39  Section 71(2)(b)(i) of the Act. Reg 27 provides that a debt counsellor, not the court, 
"must issue a clearance certificate as per Form 19 if the consumer has fully satisfied 
all the debt obligations under every credit agreement that was subject to the debt re-
arrangement order or agreement, in accordance with that order or agreement" 
[Emphasis added]. 
40  Section 71(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. 
41  Hereafter the Tribunal. 
42  Section 73(3) of the Act. 
43  Section 69 of the NCA provides for the establishment of a national credit register. To 
date no such register has been established. 
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a credit bureau.44 Upon receipt of the clearance certificate, the national 
credit register or credit bureau was obliged to expunge certain information 
regarding the debt rearrangement from its records.45 
3.2  Provisions of section 71 after amendment by the National Credit 
Amendment Act 19 of 2014 
The National Credit Amendment Act,46 however, effected significant 
amendments to section 71(1), (2), (3) and (4).47 The amended subsections 
now provide that a consumer whose debt has been re-arranged in terms of 
Part D of Chapter 4 must be issued with a clearance certificate by a debt 
counsellor within seven days after the consumer has― 
(a) satisfied all the obligations under every credit agreement that was 
subject to that debt re-arrangement order or agreement, in accordance 
with that order or agreement; or 
(b) demonstrated – 
(i)  financial ability to satisfy the future obligations in terms of the 
rearrangement order or agreement under – 
(aa) a mortgage agreement which secures a credit agreement 
for the purchase or improvement of immovable property; 
or 
(bb) any long term agreement48 as may be prescribed; 
                                            
44  Section 71(4) of the Act. 
45  Section 71(5) of the Act. The information that had to be expunged related to the fact 
that the consumer was subject to the relevant debt re-arrangement order or 
agreement; any information relating to any default by the consumer that may have 
precipitated the debt arrangement; or been considered in making the debt re-
arrangement order or agreement; and any record that a particular credit agreement 
was subject to the relevant debt rearrangement order or agreement. In terms of s 
71(6), expungement also had to occur upon receipt of a court order rescinding any 
judgment against the consumer. According to s 71(7), failure by a credit bureau to 
comply with a compliance notice issued by the NCR in terms of s 55, in relation to s 
71, constituted an offence. 
46  National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 in GN 389 in GG 37665 of 19 May 2014 
(hereafter 2014 Amendment Act). 
47  As per s 21 of the 2014 Amendment Act. 
48  The Act does not define the concept "long term agreement". It is submitted that it 
should be interpreted as an agreement that runs over a 20 year period (as is usually 
the case with mortgage agreements) or at least over a longer term than one would 
ordinarily expect a consumer to be locked into a debt restructuring order. In Phaladi 
v Lamara 2018 3 SA 265 (WCC) (hereafter the Phaladi-case) fn 14 the court 
indicated that the expression "long term agreement" is not defined, "but it would 
appear from the context that it refers to credit agreements of the sort in which the 
originally agreed period for the redemption of the debt extends over several years. 
They fall to be identified ('prescribed') in regulations, which ... have yet to be made". 
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(ii)  that there are no arrears in the re-arranged agreements 
contemplated in subparagraph (i); and 
(iii)  that all obligations under every credit agreement included in the 
re-arrangement order or agreement, other than those 
contemplated in subparagraph (i), have been settled in full. 
For the purposes of the demonstration envisaged in the new section 
71(1)(b), a debt counsellor may apply such measures as may be 
prescribed.49  
The amended section 71(3) provides that if a debt counsellor "decides not 
to issue or fails" to issue a clearance certificate as contemplated in section 
71(1), the consumer may apply to the Tribunal to review that decision. If the 
Tribunal is satisfied that the consumer is entitled to the clearance certificate 
it may order the debt counsellor to provide it. Section 71(4), as amended, 
now has two subsections and provides that a debt counsellor must within 
seven days after the issuance of a clearance certificate file a certified copy 
thereof with the national credit register and all registered credit bureaus.50 
If the debt counsellor fails to do so, the consumer may file a certified copy 
of the clearance certificate with the NCR and lodge a complaint with the 
Regulator against the debt counsellor.51 
Upon receiving a copy of a clearance certificate, a credit bureau or the 
national credit register must expunge from its records the information 
contemplated in section 71(5), as indicated in par 3.1 above. Section 71(6) 
that requires a credit bureau, upon receiving a copy of a court order 
rescinding52 any judgment, to expunge from its records all information 
relating to that judgment, was not amended by the 2014 Amendment Act. 
Neither was section 71(7), which makes it an offence for a credit bureau to 
fail to comply with a compliance notice relating to the obligation to expunge 
information. A section 71A was also introduced by the 2014 Amendment 
Act regarding automatic removal of adverse consumer credit information.53 
                                            
49  Section 71(2) as amended by the 2014 Amendment Act. 
50  Section 71(4)(a) of the Act. 
51  Section 71(4)(b) of the Act. 
52  See s 36 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 read with reg 49 of the Rules 
Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Magistrates' Courts of South Africa 
in GN R740 in GG 33487 of 23 August 2010 (hereafter the Magistrates' Court Rules) 
and reg 42 of the Uniform Rules of Court in GN R48 in GG 999 of 12 January 1965. 
53  See Kelly-Louw 2015 De Jure 92. 
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In March 2017 the NCR indicated in a circular54 that the amended section 
71 posed interpretation and implementation challenges and recorded the 
following "explanations" regarding the interpretation of the amended section 
71: The word "agreement" refers to the debt counselling proposal and not 
to the contractual agreement; a vehicle finance agreement is not a "long-
term agreement"; and a debt counselling order need not be rescinded 
before a clearance certificate can be issued. It stated that the phrase 
"measures as may be prescribed" in section 71(2) merely affords the 
Minister of Trade and Industry the discretion to prescribe additional 
measures in future should he deem it necessary. Until such time, debt 
counsellors must employ the measures currently used for assessing over-
indebtedness when assessing the consumer's financial ability to satisfy 
future obligations in terms of section 71. In the event that a credit provider, 
in response to a paid-up letter from a debt counsellor, advises that the debt 
has not been settled in full, both parties must apply the industry agreed-
upon process, still to be issued, as guidelines for end balance difference. 
The NCR further stated in the circular that it could not have been the 
intention of the legislature for the credit provider to receive payments on the 
mortgage agreement in terms of the debt counselling proposal until the 
entire agreement is settled in full. Instead, the consumer would benefit from 
the concessions in section 71 only for the remaining repayment term as 
specified in the debt restructuring agreement. Thereafter, the contractual 
obligations would apply. 
3.3  Observations regarding section 71 as amended 
From the aforesaid, it is thus clear that the amendments to section 71 were 
effected to prevent a consumer, who is subject to a debt rearrangement or 
restructuring order, being "locked into" the debt review process for years to 
come, although he has actually repaid all his restructured short-term debts 
and only his mortgage debt or other long term credit debt still has to be 
repaid under the restructuring order.55 Obviously, the legislature realised 
that consumers who paid off their restructured short-term credit debt would 
then generally, by doing so, free up money that they can use to repay their 
mortgage or other long-term debt – it may even put them in a position where 
                                            
54  NCR 2017 https://ncr.org.za/documents/Circulars/Circular%206%20of%202017-
%20Section%2071.pdf paras 1-6. It is also stated that Form 19 is currently not 
aligned to the amended s 71(1)(b) of the Act and that it can be amended only through 
regulation. 
55  Also see NCR 2015 https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/circulars/feb2015/ 
Withdrawal%20from%20debt%20review%20guidelines.pdf 3 (hereinafter NCR 
Withdrawal Guidelines or Guidelines) as discussed in 4 below. 
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they are able to pay larger instalments than the restructured instalments and 
they might even be in a position to pay instalments as per the original long-
term contractual agreement or in excess thereof. However, this may not 
always be the case – hence the requirement that the consumer demonstrate 
an "ability to repay" the mortgage or long-term credit agreement debt before 
being released from the debt review process and given a clearance 
certificate. Also, consumers who have successfully repaid their restructured 
short-term debt would not want to be shackled by the inability to enter into 
new credit agreements for years into the future due to the fact that they still 
have to repay mortgage debt or other long-term credit debts that were 
included in the debt restructuring order.  
For example, a consumer might need to buy a new vehicle on credit, but if 
he remains locked into the debt restructuring process for a number of years 
to come, because he still has to repay his mortgage debt in accordance with 
a restructuring order, he will be unable to do so. Essentially, section 71 
envisages that a consumer who has paid up all his restructured short-term 
credit obligations should be able to demonstrate that he is no longer over-
indebted as contemplated in section 79, and thus that he is now able to 
timeously repay his credit agreement debts. Alternatively, he should at least 
be able to prove that even if he is still a bit over-indebted, after having paid 
off his short-term debt, his financial position is nevertheless such that he will 
have the "ability to repay" his long-term credit obligations as restructured, 
and once the restructuring term has expired that he will be able to effect 
repayments in accordance with the original contractual terms. Thus, the 
consumer will of necessity have to provide proof of his financial means, 
prospects and obligations as envisaged by section 78(3), which should 
demonstrate to be sufficient to cover his long-term credit agreement 
instalments (for the remaining restructured term where applicable, and 
thereafter as per the original terms of the credit agreement). 
The 2014-amendments to section 71 also serve to relieve the consumer of 
the obligation to take the initiative to obtain a clearance certificate and to 
have his name cleared at the credit bureaus, which is a welcome 
intervention from a consumer protection perspective. These responsibilities 
have now been imposed on the debt counsellor, who is paid for his debt 
counselling services56 and who is obliged to provide a clearance certificate 
swiftly, namely within 7 days57 after the conditions in section 71(1) are met. 
                                            
56  NCR 2018 https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/debt%20counselling%20fee% 
20structure%20guideline.pdf. 
57  These days appear to be calendar days, as no reference is made here to business 
days as provided for in s 2(5). 
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The debt counsellor must apparently do so without being requested as such 
by the consumer, which means the debt counsellor will have to keep abreast 
of the status of repayments by the consumer in terms of the debt 
restructuring order. It is also now the debt counsellor's obligation to attend 
to the removal of the consumer's name from credit bureau records. 
4  The Withdrawal Guidelines and Explanatory Note to the 
Withdrawal Guidelines 
As indicated in paragraph 2 above, provision is made in section 86(10)(a) 
and (b) of the NCA for a credit provider to terminate a pending debt review 
prior to the filing of a debt restructuring application at the Magistrate's Court 
in certain circumstances, for example where no progress is made with the 
debt review and/or the restructuring proposal is not viable.58 However, the 
NCA does not contain any specific provision that allows a consumer or a 
debt counsellor to terminate the debt review process or to withdraw from 
it.59 Notably, section 71 appears to cater for the situation where the debt 
review process has basically run its course insofar as restructured short-
term credit debt is concerned. Nevertheless, situations have over the years 
arisen where either consumers or debt counsellors wanted to withdraw from 
an ongoing debt review at various stages before having paid up the 
restructured debt in accordance with section 71 (as it originally read). To 
facilitate such exit, an industry practice developed that led to the use of a 
Form 17.4, which was not initially prescribed in the Act or regulations, but 
that was crafted by the credit industry itself to facilitate voluntary withdrawal 
from debt review.60  
However, in Rougier v Nedbank Ltd61 it was held that a debt counsellor who 
attempted to "withdraw" a debt review in accordance with Form 17.4 acted 
                                            
58  For a detailed discussion of the process of the termination of debt review in 
accordance with s 86(10) of the Act, see Van Heerden "Over-indebtedness and 
Reckless Lending" para 11.3. Also see Van Heerden and Coetzee 2011 PELJ 37; 
and Van Heerden and Coetzee 2011 De Jure 463. 
59  Generally, a debt review can be terminated only in accordance with s 86(10) of the 
Act. However, Roestoff and Smit 2011 THRHR 501 also validly argue that a debt 
review which is not taken to completion should lapse after a reasonable period of 
time. Such a situation is not the focus of this contribution, which particularly deals 
with the situation of a consumer who wishes to exit the debt review process because 
his financial position has improved and he is factually not over-indebted anymore. 
60  NCR Withdrawal Guidelines 3. Form 17.4 was addressed to all relevant credit 
providers and indicated that the application for debt counselling had been voluntarily 
withdrawn by the consumer. It also stated that the credit bureaus had been updated 
via the Debt Help System and that the NCR had been advised of the withdrawal. 
61  Rougier v Nedbank Ltd (GPJ) (unreported) case number 27333/2010 of 28 May 
2013. This matter concerned an application for the rescission of a default judgment. 
CM VAN HEERDEN & H COETZEE PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 16 
 
ultra vires the NCA. Although the Rougier judgment did not specifically deal 
with the situation where a consumer wanted to withdraw from debt review, 
for whatever reasons, the decision nevertheless practically put an end to 
the use of Form 17.4. 
As a result of the decision in Rougier v Nedbank Ltd, the NCR issued 
Withdrawal Guidelines on 19 February 2015 (that is, after the 2014 
Amendment Act (which among other things amended section 71) was 
signed, but before the said amendment Act came into effect). These 
Withdrawal Guidelines were required to be applied by all industry 
participants with immediate effect and were intended to replace the use of 
the Form 17.4. The Withdrawal Guidelines also pertinently confirm, in line 
with the Rougier judgment, that a debt counsellor does not have the 
statutory powers to terminate or withdraw from the debt review process and 
therefore that a debt counsellor can no longer issue a Form 17.4 for such a 
(purported) purpose. 
The 2015 Withdrawal Guidelines further state that section 71 as amended, 
will provide the basis on which a consumer may withdraw from debt review. 
It states that a consumer can "withdraw" from or "terminate" the debt review 
process only prior to a "declaration" of over-indebtedness in accordance 
with section 86(7) (thus, by a court) and (prior to) the issuing of a Form 17.2, 
subject to payment of debt counselling fees.62 It also rather confusingly 
states: "[I]f a determination is made and no court order is in place, the 
consumer will remain under debt review."63 This reference to a 
"determination" appears to pertain to the situation where the debt counsellor 
has made a determination as required by section 86(6).64 The Withdrawal 
Guidelines further indicate that once a debt restructuring order by a court 
has been obtained, a consumer can "withdraw" therefrom by applying to 
                                            
The consumer among others alleged (para 3) that she was under debt review at the 
time that the credit provider issued summons and she further alleged that the credit 
provider did not send her a s 129(1)(a)-notice prior to enforcement. The credit 
provider alleged (para 4) that it was not necessary to comply with s 129(1)(a) or s 
86(10) of the Act, because the debt counsellor had "withdrawn" the debt review prior 
to the institution of the enforcement action. The court stated that the debt counsellor 
fulfilled a statutory function. Because there was no provision in the NCA that 
empowers the debt counsellor to "withdraw" the debt review "instituted" in terms of 
s 86(1), the court found that the purported withdrawal by the debt counsellor was 
ultra vires with the effect that the debt review was thus still pending at the time that 
the credit provider instituted action. 
62  NCR Withdrawal Guidelines 4.  
63  NCR Withdrawal Guidelines 4. Emphasis added.  
64  See the discussion in 2 above. 
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have the order rescinded "or" by applying for an order declaring that the 
consumer is no longer over-indebted.65 
The aforesaid Withdrawal Guidelines have to be read with the Explanatory 
Note to the Withdrawal Guidelines,66 which was subsequently issued to aid 
the interpretation of the Guidelines.67 The Explanatory Note is drafted in a 
slightly confusing and somewhat repetitive manner. It again confirms that 
debt counsellors can no longer withdraw from the debt review process and 
that the use of Form 17.4 is not valid.68 It deals in more depth with the 
question whether a consumer can withdraw from the debt review process 
after a court order (declaring the consumer over-indebted and restructuring 
his credit agreement debt) has been granted. According to the Explanatory 
Note, it is indeed possible for a consumer to withdraw from the debt review 
process in such an instance by bringing an application to the Magistrate's 
Court with jurisdiction69 for the rescission of the restructuring order, 
requesting that the consumer be declared no longer over-indebted.70 The 
application must indicate that the consumer has been found over-indebted 
(previously) by the Magistrate's Court and a copy of the restructuring order 
must be attached as an annexure. The application must further advise the 
court that the consumer is no longer over-indebted and must include the 
consumer's financial circumstances at the time, in motivation of the request 
for the rescission of the restructuring order. The court must also be advised 
that the consumer no longer needs to be under debt review.71 
Upon receipt of the granted rescission order, the debt counsellor must: 
(a)  notify all the credit providers of the same by means of the Form 17.W 
and attach a copy of the granted rescission Court Order;72 
                                            
65  NCR Withdrawal Guidelines 4. 
66  NCR 2015 https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/Withdrawal_guidelines/Explanatory% 
 20Note%20to%20the%20Withdrawal%20Guidelines.pdf (hereinafter NCR 
Explanatory Note). 
67  See the introduction to the Explanatory Note where it is indicated that the reason for 
the issuing of the Explanatory Note was challenges experienced by industry 
regarding the implementation of certain aspects of the Guidelines. 
68  Explanatory Note para 2. 
69 In other words, the Magistrate's Court that gave the restructuring order. 
70  Thus, the Explanatory Note differs from the NCR Withdrawal Guidelines in this 
respect as the NCR Withdrawal Guidelines appear to indicate that the consumer can 
either apply for rescission or for a declaration to be "not over-indebted". 
71  Explanatory Note para 3. 
72  Form 17.W is attached to the NCR Withdrawal Guidelines. It serves to notify credit 
providers of the following options: 
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(b)  remove the consumer's debt review flag on the credit bureaux by 
updating the DHS73 with the relevant status code.74 
The Explanatory Note indicates further that it is possible, as stated in the 
Withdrawal Guidelines, for a consumer to withdraw from the debt review 
process prior to obtaining a "debt review court order" (in other words, a debt 
restructuring order). The Explanatory Note then distinguishes between the 
situation where the consumer wishes to withdraw prior to the "declaration of 
over-indebtedness" and "post the declaration of over-indebtedness".75  
Withdrawal by the consumer prior to the "declaration" of over-indebtedness 
can, in terms of the Explanatory Note, occur before the "declaration of over-
indebtedness and issuance of Form 17.2 to credit providers", in which 
instance the debt counsellor must issue Form 17.W and update the DHS 
with status code "G (Withdrawal by consumer)".76 
As regards withdrawal by the consumer post a "declaration" of over-
indebtedness the Explanatory Note states as follows:77 
 The debt counsellor has the statutory power to recommend that the 
consumer be declared over-indebted, however, the Magistrates Court 
in terms of Section 85(b), Section 87(1) and/or Section 88(1)(b) of the 
                                            
a) The consumer has withdrawn from the debt review process prior to the issuance of 
Form 17.2 and the credit bureaus have been updated accordingly via the NCR Debt 
Help System. 
b) The debt counsellor has suspended the provision of service due to non-cooperation by 
the consumer. The debt counsellor remains the debt counsellor on record. 
c) The consumer has obtained a court order to rescind the debt review order. Credit 
bureaus have been updated via the NCR Debt Help System. 
d) The consumer has obtained a court order declaring the consumer no longer over 
indebted. Credit bureaus have been updated via the NCR Debt Help System. 
73  The NCR created the Debt Help System (DHS) for debt counsellors to register and 
update records pertaining to consumers subject to debt review, which information, 
in turn, credit bureaus use to update their records accordingly. Debt counsellors' 
conditions of registration require of them to regularly maintain and update the 
system. This is done by recording specific status codes (which the NCR continuously 
develops to keep abreast of developments in the debt review sphere) to reflect 
progress. See for instance NCR 2018 https://ncr.org.za/documents/ 
Circulars/NCR%20Circular%2004%20of%20August%202018.pdf; NCR 2017 
https://ncr.org.za/documents/Circulars/DHS%20 
Automated%20transfers%20circular%20.pdf; and NCR 2016 
https://ncr.org.za/documents/Circulars/Circular%20No7%20DHS.pdf. 
74  It is stated that the applicable status code remains G (withdrawal by consumer) and 
that it is only once all these steps, which culminate in the issuing of a Form 17.W, 
have been successfully completed that compliance with the Withdrawal Guidelines 
can be said to have taken place. 
75  Emphasis added. 
76  Explanatory Note para 4.1. 
77  Explanatory Note para 4.2. 
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Act has powers to declare the consumer over-indebted or not over-
indebted. 
 If the debt counsellor has recommended that the consumer be declared 
over-indebted and the Form 17.2 has been issued to credit providers, 
the consumer must approach the Magistrates Court with the relevant 
jurisdiction to be declared not over-indebted and no longer under debt 
review.78 
 A court application in terms of Section 87(1)(a) of the Act must be made 
to the Magistrates Court with relevant jurisdiction requesting the Court 
to reject the debt counsellor's recommendation that the consumer be 
found over-indebted; and declare the consumer no longer over-
indebted. 
 The application must advise the Court that the consumer had been 
found over-indebted by the debt counsellor and a copy of the Form 17.2 
is to be attached as an annexure. 
 The applicant must advise the relevant Magistrates Court that the 
consumer is no longer over-indebted and must include the consumer's 
financial circumstances at that time in motivation of the aforesaid.  
 The application must further advise the relevant Magistrates Court that 
the consumer no longer needs to be under debt review. 
The gist of the aforementioned paragraph is thus that the NCR is of the view 
that in the event that the debt counsellor has found (determined or as the 
Explanatory Note incorrectly states "declared") the consumer to be over-
indebted; has sent out the Form 17.2; and has filed an application (a 
recommendation) to have the consumer declared over-indebted and to 
restructure his debt (but which application is not yet granted by the court), 
then the consumer can approach the court (apparently in opposition to the 
aforementioned application) and request the court to reject the 
recommendation that the consumer is over-indebted and to specifically 
declare the consumer "not over-indebted". 
4.1  Further observations regarding section 71, the Withdrawal 
Guidelines and Explanatory Note to the Withdrawal Guidelines 
4.1.1  General 
From the above overview it is clear that a consumer can exit a debt review 
process that has "run its course" upon compliance with section 71, which 
basically means that, except for mortgage and other long-term debt, he has 
paid up his other short term credit debts as restructured by the court in 
accordance with a debt restructuring order (obtained either by consent or 
                                            
78  Emphasis added. 
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on application in terms of section 86(7)(c) as explained in paragraph 2 
above). The NCA does not specifically impose an obligation that the court 
who made the declaration of over-indebtedness again be approached for 
an order to declare the consumer "no longer over-indebted" once he has 
complied with section 71.79 It is submitted that the ex lege effect of 
compliance with section 71 is that the consumer is no longer over-indebted 
and no longer under debt review. As indicated, section 71 also mandates 
that, upon receipt of the clearance certificate, the detail of such a debt 
review must be expunged from the credit bureaus' records.  
Although the amended section 71 provides an opportunity for consumers 
who are under debt review to exit the process at an earlier stage, without 
requiring the full repayment of mortgage and other long-term credit 
agreements in accordance with the debt restructuring order, its application 
is limited. Having regard to the tenor of section 71, it is submitted that this 
section was drafted with a specific type of consumer in mind, namely an 
over-indebted consumer whose financial position remains such that he has 
to go through the whole debt review process in all its stages (in other words, 
let the process run its course) to eventually reach a situation where, as a 
result of this process, he is "rehabilitated" to such an extent that he has paid 
off his short-term credit and can exit the process and become a responsible 
user of credit again. It was not written for a consumer whose financial 
position changed for the better after having entered the debt review process. 
The legislature simply did not have such a scenario in mind when it drafted 
section 71. As such, it is submitted that section 71 was drafted with a 
"completed debt review" process in mind, at least insofar as short-term 
credit debt is concerned. Therefore, it is clear that section 71 in its current 
format does not avail consumers whose financial position has improved, 
since they applied for debt review, but who do not meet the requirements 
for a clearance certificate – namely, that they should have repaid all their 
short-term restructured debt and are able to show that they have the 
financial ability to make timeous future payments. If a consumer wishes to 
exit the debt review process because his financial situation has improved, 
but he has not yet fully repaid all his restructured short-term debts in 
accordance with the debt restructuring order, he will be unable to do so in 
terms of section 71. 
Therefore, it may be asked whether the NCR Withdrawal Guidelines and 
Explanatory Note aid the situation of consumers whose financial situation 
                                            
79  As also confirmed in the explanation provided in the circular relating to s 71 of the 
Act, as discussed in 3.2 above. 
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has improved and who wish to exit the debt review process, but who do not 
meet the requirements of section 71. Thus, what is the status of these 
guidelines, and also, is the approach taken in the Guidelines correct? 
At the outset, it is important to note that, although section 1680 of the NCA 
permits the NCR to provide guidance to the credit market and industry by 
issuing explanatory notices (which one could argue also include guidelines, 
although the Act specifically refers to the NCR issuing "guidelines" in two 
instances,81 which are unrelated to the matter under consideration), the 
purpose of such notices is to outline the NCR's procedures, or its non-
binding opinion of any provision of the NCA. Accordingly, these notices are 
non-binding and do not constitute substantive law and thus, cannot 
authorise or allow anything that the Act, in terms of which they are issued, 
does not permit.  
It is submitted that, if the NCA itself does not make any specific – or at least 
implied – provision for withdrawal or exit from the debt review process by 
consumers, other than in the circumstances provided in section 71, it is not 
competent for the NCR to devise a procedure to achieve such withdrawal in 
the absence of a legislative provision catering therefor. Consequently, it has 
to be considered whether, having regard to the normal course of the debt 
review process, it may be possible, even in the absence of a specific 
provision facilitating exit from debt review (other than as contemplated by 
section 71), by implication to construe certain opportunities for the 
consumer to exit debt review. If so, it would then be competent for the NCR 
to bring these opportunities implied by the provisions of the Act to the 
attention of consumers via guidelines. Before embarking on this 
investigation, it is again necessary to bear in mind that (a) prior to a court 
order’s being made, the debt review process contemplated in section 86 is 
a voluntary process and (b) the effects of debt review insofar as the bar 
against entry into new agreements by the consumer (section 88(1)) and the 
moratorium against enforcement by credit providers (section 88(3)) are 
concerned, are triggered already at the moment when the consumer applies 
                                            
80  Section 16 of the Act provides for explanatory notices in general. However, some 
other sections in the NCA provide for specific powers to issue guidelines. 
81  Prior to its amendment by s 24 of 2014 Amendment Act, s 82(2)(b) provided for the 
NCR to issue guidelines regarding pre-agreement assessments. At present, s 64(3) 
determines that the NCR "may publish guidelines" in relation to measures to assess 
whether a document adheres to s 64(1)(b) prescriptions, the latter of which refers to 
the requirement that documents should be drafted in plain language. Further, s 93(4) 
provides that the NCR "may publish guidelines" to assist in the assessment of 
whether a statement in relation to an intermediate or large agreement adheres to set 
requirements. 
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to the debt counsellor for debt review. Against this context one can then 
consider the following scenarios: 
4.1.2 Debt review application with debt counsellor but no forms sent out 
yet  
Where a consumer has applied to a debt counsellor for debt review and if, 
before any Form 17.1 and/or Form 17.2 has been sent out, such a consumer 
changes his mind and decides not to pursue the application for debt review, 
then given the voluntary nature of the process and the lack of any formal 
declaration of over-indebtedness by a court, the consumer should be able 
on his own initiative to exit the process. If he has not yet paid the debt 
counsellor he should do so, but it is submitted that the mere fact that fees 
may be due to the debt counsellor should not bar the consumer from 
withdrawing from and exiting the debt review process. The effect of 
withdrawal at this stage will be that the (very short-lived) bar against entry 
into new agreements and the moratorium against enforcement, which was 
triggered when the consumer approached the debt counsellor, will cease to 
apply. 
4.1.3 Debt review application with debt counsellor and Form 17.1 sent 
If the consumer decides to exit the debt review process after he lodged his 
application with the debt counsellor and after a Form 17.1 has been sent 
out, and before or after the debt counsellor made a determination regarding 
his over-indebtedness (but before a Form 17.2 has been sent out), it is 
submitted that it would also be possible for the consumer to exit the debt 
review process. Notably, the purpose of a Form 17.1 is merely for the debt 
counsellor to advise the credit providers and credit bureaus of the fact that 
the consumer has applied for debt review. Once the credit providers receive 
this notice, they will know that they have to observe the moratorium against 
debt enforcement, that the consumer is not allowed to take out further credit 
and that none of them should extend further credit to the consumer. As per 
section 86(4) read with regulation 24(2), the Form 17.1 has to be sent out 
by the debt counsellor within 5 business days after receipt of the consumer's 
application for debt review. The fact that the debt counsellor has (or has not) 
at that stage made a determination regarding the consumer's state of over-
indebtedness should not influence the consumer's ability to withdraw, 
because such a determination by itself does not bring about any specific 
effects. Accordingly, if the consumer wishes to withdraw from debt review 
after the Form 17.1 has been sent out, the debt counsellor will have to inform 
the credit providers and update the DHS accordingly. If the consumer has 
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not yet paid the debt counsellor for all his services, he will be liable for such 
payment, but this should not bar him from withdrawing from and exiting the 
debt review process at this stage. The effect of such a withdrawal would 
then also be that the bar against entry into new credit agreements and the 
moratorium on enforcement will no longer apply. 
4.1.4 Debt review application with debt counsellor and Forms 17.1 and 
17.2 sent 
Having regard to the content of Form 17.2 read with regulation 24(10), it 
appears that this form is intended to be sent out within 5 business days after 
the debt counsellor has duly assessed the consumer's application and 
made a determination as contemplated in section 86(6) regarding the 
consumer's state of over-indebtedness. No mention is made in section 86 
or regulation 24 that Form 17.2 has to be sent out after a court order in terms 
of section 87 has actually been made. However, this is contradicted by Form 
17.2 itself. Having regard to its wording, Form 17.2 serves to inform the 
credit providers and credit bureaus that either the consumer's application 
for debt review was rejected or his application for debt review was 
successful and his debt obligations are in the process of being restructured 
or that the consumer's debt obligations "have been restructured and a 
court/Tribunal order has been issued" (Form 17.2 allows for mentioning of 
the case number and specific Magistrate's Court that issued the court 
order). Given their different purposes, it is clear that Form 17.1 and Form 
17. 2 have to be sent out at different times during the debt review process. 
Further, it may be argued that the addition of the reference to the granting 
of a restructuring order in Form 17.2 is wrong and that Form 17.2 should for 
all practical purposes be construed as facilitating only the notification of the 
debt counsellor's determination (his assessment) in terms of section 86(6), 
namely the position before a court order is made. It is submitted that, if Form 
17.2 is correctly construed, this would mean that it should be sent out within 
5 business days after the debt counsellor's determination, at which stage a 
court order restructuring the debt would not yet have been made.82 This 
                                            
82  Even in the instance of a consent order, an application for a declaration of over-
indebtedness and a restructuring order would generally have to be brought on 10 
court days prior notice (Magistrate’s Courts Rule 55) and even if opposed, an 
application for debt restructuring would also require at least 10 court days prior 
notice, but given the congestion of court rolls it can take a significant amount of time 
before such a matter is heard, depending on the Magistrate's Court where it serves. 
The point is, it is unlikely that either of these orders will be made by a court within 5 
business days after the debt counsellor's determination. Hence, Form 17.2 cannot 
be construed by virtue of reg 24(10) to have contemplated both the determination by 
the debt counsellor as well as the subsequent hearing and court order.  
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means that at the time that the Form 17.2 notice should, in accordance with 
regulation 24(10), be sent out (thus, after the debt counsellor has made the 
determination required by section 86(6), but before a court order is made) 
the matter has not yet served before court for a formal declaration of over-
indebtedness and consequent debt restructuring. Accordingly, it is 
submitted that, where a Form 17.2 is correctly sent out after the debt 
counsellor's determination and before any application for debt restructuring 
is filed at court (and thus before a court has declared the consumer over-
indebted and restructured his debt) it would still be open to the consumer to 
exit the debt review process by own volition, because he has not yet been 
declared formally over-indebted and he is not subject to any restructuring 
order. In such an instance, the debt counsellor should advise the credit 
providers in writing that the consumer has withdrawn from and exited from 
the debt review process and should update the DHS accordingly. The 
consumer would be liable for all applicable debt counselling costs he had 
not yet paid, but this should not bar him from exiting the debt review process 
at this stage. The effect would then also be that the bar to entry into new 
credit agreements and the moratorium on enforcement ceases to apply. 
4.1.5 Debt review application to debt counsellor, Forms 17.1 and 17.2 sent 
and restructuring recommendation (proposal) referred to court but 
not yet heard 
In the scenario where a Form 17.1 and a Form 17.2 notice have been sent 
out and the debt counsellor has referred the recommendation to restructure 
the consumer's debt to court, in other words the restructuring application 
has been filed and is pending, but where the matter has not yet been heard 
by the court, it is submitted that the consumer should also be able to 
voluntarily withdraw from and exit the debt review process. However, from 
the NCR Explanatory Note it appears that the NCR is of the opinion that in 
such instance the court has to be requested to formally dismiss the 
application and declare the consumer not over-indebted. However, it is 
submitted that the consumer need not go to such lengths because at this 
stage of the debt review process the court has not yet had any regard to the 
application and until a court has declared the consumer over-indebted he is 
not yet formally over-indebted for the purposes of the NCA. Therefore, in 
the absence of a court order declaring him over-indebted, the consumer 
should on his own volition and without having to give reasons be able to exit 
the process without pursuing any court order in this context. Of course, the 
consumer will be liable for any applicable debt counselling fees and legal 
costs (including wasted costs of opposition), but this should not bar him from 
exiting the debt review process at this stage. The debt counsellor will have 
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to inform the credit providers and credit bureaus accordingly and update the 
debt help system. The effect of such a withdrawal would also be that the bar 
against entry into a new credit agreement and the moratorium on 
enforcement would cease to apply.  
4.1.6 A Magistrate's Court has declared consumer over-indebted and 
granted debt restructuring order  
Notably, when a court order formally declaring the consumer over-indebted 
and restructuring his credit agreement debt (or affirming a voluntary 
rearrangement agreement by means of a consent order) has been made, 
additional consequences kick in and section 88(3) of the NCA applies. This 
means that the consumer is then obliged to comply with the terms of the 
debt restructuring order, until he has satisfied the requirements of section 
71, as discussed in paragraph 3 above, in which event he can then obtain 
a clearance certificate and exit the debt review process. If he does not 
comply with his payment obligations in terms of the restructuring order, the 
credit provider(s) may ex lege, and without the need to comply with either 
section 86(10) or section 129 of the NCA, enforce the original terms of the 
relevant credit agreement(s).83 
As argued above, a consumer is not barred from voluntarily withdrawing 
from the voluntary debt review process envisaged by section 86 if no court 
order formalising the process has been made. There is no section in the Act 
that expressly or by necessary implication prohibits such a withdrawal and 
the "informal" administrative nature of the review by the debt counsellor, 
prior to any court involvement, appears to accommodate such a withdrawal. 
However, the proceedings take on a judicial nature by the granting of a 
formal declaration of over-indebtedness and accompanying debt 
restructuring order that compels compliance by the consumer with the terms 
of such an order, failing which enforcement of the original terms of the credit 
agreement may follow. It may then be asked whether the guideline by the 
NCR, to the effect that a consumer who wishes to withdraw from and exit 
the debt review process at an earlier stage than contemplated in section 71 
can apply to the Magistrate's Court to "rescind or vary"84 such a debt 
restructuring order and to be declared "no longer over-indebted and no 
longer under debt review", is correct. Obviously, given that such a 
restructuring order actually has two parts, as pointed out in paragraph 2 
above, namely a declaration of over-indebtedness followed by the terms of 
                                            
83  Ferris v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2014 3 SA 39 (CC) 46; Firstrand Bank Ltd v Kona 2015 
5 SA 237 (SCA) paras 19-21. 
84  Emphasis added. 
CM VAN HEERDEN & H COETZEE PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 26 
 
restructuring, any application for rescission, if possible, should contain a 
prayer requiring an order that the debtor be declared no longer over-
indebted and a prayer for the restructuring order to be set aside. This would 
be different from an application for "variation" of the debt restructuring order, 
which merely seeks to change the terms of the said restructuring order 
(thus, keeping the restructuring order in place but, for example, only 
providing for higher instalments). However, the latter situation, it is 
submitted, is not appropriate in the current context, because it is not aimed 
at doing away with the declaration of over-indebtedness and the 
restructuring order and thereby facilitating an exit from the debt review 
process. Thus, it appears that the NCR's view that a consumer who wishes 
to be declared no longer over-indebted and no longer under debt review can 
apply for a rescission or variation of the debt restructuring order granted by 
a Magistrate's Court is wrong, and the variation of an order is not applicable 
in the context under discussion. 
To pronounce on whether the NCR is correct in its submission that the 
Magistrate's Court can be approached by a consumer to "rescind" the debt 
restructuring order "or"85 to be declared no longer over-indebted, regard 
should be had to the provisions of the Magistrates' Courts Act and rules that 
deal with the power of the Magistrate's Court, if any, to make a declaratory 
order, and the court's powers in respect of the rescission of judgments. This 
is because the NCA itself does not provide for the rescission of a debt 
restructuring order and the process to be followed. As pointed out in 
paragraph 3 above, there are no specific provisions in either the NCA or the 
Magistrates' Courts Act that deal with a declaration that the consumer is no 
longer over-indebted and need no longer be under debt review. 
It is submitted that a consumer who wishes to withdraw from and exit a debt 
review, where there is a debt restructuring order in place that has not yet 
been fully complied with in the sense that at least all the restructured short-
term debt obligations are paid up (namely, the situation envisaged by 
section 71 is not met), will have to direct his application at both parts of the 
debt restructuring order and (a) apply to be declared no longer over-
indebted and (b) that the debt restructuring order be rescinded. 
It is quite a vexed question whether a Magistrate's Court can make a 
declaratory order. This question was recently considered again on appeal 
                                            
85  Explanatory Note. As pointed out above, given the two components of a debt 
restructuring order, namely the declaration of over-indebtedness and the 
restructuring order, if a rescission as contended by the NCR is at all possible the 
word "and" instead of "or" should have been used. 
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in Moyana v Body Corporate of Cottonwood, in which the court, among 
other observations, remarked that "[w]hen a party asks a court to declare 
something, it is by definition seeking a declaratory."86 In this case, the court 
pointed out that Magistrates' Courts are creatures of statute and that their 
jurisdiction must be deduced from the four corners of the statute under 
which they are constituted.87 It further pointed out that there is no provision 
in the Magistrates' Court Act that grants Magistrate’s Courts (general) 
jurisdiction to grant a declaration of rights. However, the court indicated that 
it has been held that Magistrate’s Courts would have such jurisdiction "if it 
were granted special jurisdiction by statute".88 It referred to the special 
jurisdiction granted to the Magistrate's Courts with respect to actions in 
terms of the Close Corporations Act.89 It further remarked  
[t]hat is however a special case and neither section 29 nor any other provision 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act confers jurisdiction on a magistrate’s court to 
grant any kind of declaration. 
Having regard to the provisions of the NCA that relate to debt review, as 
contemplated in section 86, it is clear that the NCA is a lex specialis, which 
grants the Magistrate's Courts the power in terms of section 85, read with 
section 86, to declare a consumer over-indebted. Section 87, which deals 
with the hearing of an application for debt restructuring (containing the debt 
counsellor's restructuring proposal), does not specifically state that the 
Magistrate's Court hearing such an application can declare the consumer 
"not over-indebted", although it indicates that the court may, among other 
decisions, "reject the recommendation or application, as the case may be". 
Thus, it may be argued that it is implied by such a rejection that the court 
has found the consumer to be not over-indebted (although such a rejection 
can of course also occur in instances where the consumer is over-indebted, 
but where the debt restructuring proposal is not viable). However, section 
88(1)(b) specifically refers to the scenario where a "court has determined 
that the consumer is not over-indebted".90 Such a declaration – that a 
consumer is "not over-indebted" – will in the normal course of events occur 
                                            
86  Moyana v Body Corporate of Cottonwood (GPJ) (unreported) case number 
A3068/16 of 17 February 2017 (hereafter the Moyana case).  
87  Moyana case para 8 with reference to Ndamase v Functions 4 All 2004 5 SA 602 
(SCA) 605G-H; Sibiya v Minister of Police 1979 1 SA 333 (T) 337C. 
88  Moyana case para 18. 
89  Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. See s 29(1)(fA). See further Johnson v A Blaikie 
& Co (Pty) Ltd t/a FT Building Supplies Manaba 1998 3 SA 251 (N) 259D-260A. 
90  As indicated in 2 above, s 88(1)(b) of the Act refers to the situation where a consumer 
who has applied for debt review is barred from entering into new credit agreements 
until, among other things, a court has determined that the consumer is not over-
indebted, or has rejected the debt counsellor's proposal or the consumer's 
application for debt restructuring. 
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where the debt counsellor initially refers the matter to the Magistrate's Court 
via a debt restructuring application, which requires the court to declare the 
consumer over-indebted and to restructure his debt as contemplated in 
section 86(7)(c) of the NCA.91 Given that the court has a discretion ("may") 
to declare a consumer over-indebted, one can thus also argue that this of 
necessity implies that a court can declare a consumer "not to be over-
indebted", where the court finds that the debt counsellor wrongly determined 
that the consumer was over-indebted. Section 88(1)(b) would also apply 
where the debt counsellor determines, in accordance with section 86(7)(a), 
that a consumer is not over-indebted and the consumer himself 
subsequently approaches a court in accordance with section 86(9) read with 
regulation 25 and 26 to be declared over-indebted but the court, like the 
debt counsellor, finds that the consumer is not over-indebted. 
The point is that the context in which the court can make such an order – 
declaring the consumer not over-indebted – is clear, namely pursuant to a 
determination by the debt counsellor that a consumer is over-indebted (as 
per section 86(6)) and a recommendation (as per section 86(7)(c)) that his 
debt be restructured. Alternatively, such an order may follow in the situation 
where the consumer approaches the court directly as envisaged by section 
86(9). Section 88(1)(b) does not envisage a situation where, after a court 
has already declared the consumer over-indebted and restructured his debt, 
the court can again be approached, but this time to declare the consumer 
not over-indebted. Accordingly, it is submitted that section 88(1)(b) should 
be construed within its proper context, which is that a court that is 
approached in the normal course of events, as envisaged by section 86, for 
a declaration of over-indebtedness and debt restructuring pursuant to a 
recommendation by a debt counsellor, or directly by a consumer pursuant 
to section 86(9), may in its discretion, after hearing the matter, decide that 
the consumer is actually not over-indebted.  
To construe the power of the court to make a declaration that a consumer 
is "not over-indebted" as having been intended by the legislature to facilitate 
withdrawal from debt review by consumers whose financial situation has 
improved would be to misread the course and context of the debt review 
process as intended and would amount to an untenable distortion of section 
88(1)(b) and the debt review process. The legislature simply, and it is 
submitted rightly so, did not have this scenario in mind when it drafted 
                                            
91  It is arguable whether it would be necessary for a court to make a declaration of 
over-indebtedness where a voluntary debt rearrangement agreement between the 
consumer and his credit providers as contemplated in s 86(8)(a) of the Act is made 
a consent order in terms of s 138. 
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section 88(1)(b). As there is no special provision in the NCA to provide 
authority to the Magistrate's Courts to declare a consumer "not over-
indebted" where his financial situation improved, since applying for debt 
review and after having been declared over-indebted and being subjected 
to a debt restructuring order, the Magistrate's Court, as a creature of its 
enabling statute, simply cannot assist these consumers. 
In any event, even if one would play devil's advocate and argue that the 
Magistrate's Court could declare the consumer no longer over-indebted, it 
would also have to deal with the rescission of the debt restructuring order. 
Declaring the consumer not over-indebted would entail that a court would 
first have to consider the consumer's current financial means, prospects and 
obligations to determine whether he is factually no longer over-indebted as 
envisaged by section 79 of the NCA. Once it is established that the 
consumer is no longer over-indebted, the issue of the rescission of the debt 
restructuring order would then have to be considered. 
The rescission (and variation) of judgments in the Magistrate's Court is dealt 
with in section 36 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, which, among other things, 
provides that:92 
The court may, upon application by any person affected thereby, or, in cases 
falling under paragraph (c), suo motu,- 
(a) rescind or vary any judgment granted by it in the absence of the person 
against whom that judgment was granted; 
(b)  rescind or vary any judgment granted by it which was void ab origine or 
was obtained by fraud or by mistake common to the parties; 
(c)  correct patent errors in any judgment in respect of which no appeal is 
pending; 
(d)  rescind or vary any judgment in respect of which no appeal lies. 
Section 36 of the Magistrates' Courts Act makes no mention of rescission 
of a debt restructuring order that was granted pursuant to a debt review in 
terms of section 86. Further, it is clear that neither section 36(a) nor section 
36(b) or (c) finds application in the matter under discussion. As argued 
above, the option of "varying" or "correcting" the order of the court is 
inappropriate to deal with the issue at hand, because it will mean that the 
court order still remains intact, only with changed terms. Such a situation is 
                                            
92  Section 36(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act. S 36 should be read with Magistrates' 
Courts Rule 49, which sets out the procedure for bringing a rescission application in 
the Magistrate's Court. 
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not what is sought to be achieved when requiring a declaration that a 
consumer is no longer over-indebted and no longer under debt review. 
Thus, it may be asked whether the present issue can be addressed by 
applying section 36(d), in the sense of rescinding "any judgment in respect 
of which no appeal lies." 
Van Loggerenberg comments that the phrase "against which no appeal lies" 
has a very specific meaning, in that it refers to interlocutory orders, which 
are orders that cannot be appealed against, since they are not final orders.93 
This would mean that a debt restructuring order, which is clearly a final 
order, does not fit the mould of the orders that can be rescinded in terms of 
section 36(d).  
Another argument (yielding a rather circular answer), which may probably 
be raised to counteract the problem relating to the rescission of the debt 
restructuring order, is that once a Magistrate's Court declares a consumer 
"not over-indebted", the accompanying debt restructuring order should 
lapse ex lege, because the rationale for that order then falls away. However, 
this argument cannot be entertained. This is because firstly the Magistrate's 
Court, as pointed out, cannot make such a declaration, because the NCA 
as lex specialis does not support it – the context of section 88(1)(b) is that 
no restructuring order is yet in place by the time that the court makes the 
order contemplated in section 88(1)(b). Secondly, if the Magistrate's Court 
cannot make such a declaratory order, the issue of ex lege lapsing of the 
restructuring order does not arise. 
In view of the lack of an enabling provision in the NCA, which would allow a 
Magistrate's Court to make a declaration to the effect that a consumer who 
wishes to withdraw from debt review after a restructuring order has been 
granted, but before compliance with section 71, can be declared to be "not 
over-indebted" with the result that he no longer needs to be under debt 
review, it would not be competent for a Magistrate's Court, being a creature 
of statute, to make such an order.  
It may then be asked whether such a declarator can be obtained from the 
High Court, given that the jurisdiction of the High Courts has been held in 
                                            
93  Van Loggerenberg Jones and Buckle: Civil Practice 254. Regarding interlocutory 
orders against which no appeal lies, see the locus classicus Pretoria Garrison 
Institutes v Danish Variety Products (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 839 (A). In this case, it was 
indicated that the test whether an order is of a final nature and can be appealed 
against hinges on whether the order determines the rights of the parties on the point 
finally and conclusively so far as the court pronouncing it is concerned, so that it will 
not come up for reconsideration in the further proceedings in the case. 
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Nedbank Ltd v Mateman; Nedbank Ltd v Stringer not to have been ousted 
by the NCA?94 
The evolution of the power of the High Court to grant declarators can be 
traced back to the common law, where the High Court did not have the 
power to grant declaratory orders without consequential relief.95 The power 
to grant such orders was conferred upon the High Court by the legislature, 
originally in section 102 of the General Laws Amendment Act 46 of 1935. 
The power to grant a declaratory order was subsequently captured in 
section 19(1)(a)(iii) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, which has now 
been repealed by the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. Section 21(1)(c) of 
the Superior Courts Act96 currently deals with the High Court's jurisdiction 
to grant a declaratory order under the heading "[p]owers over and matters 
in relation to which Divisions have jurisdiction" and provides that the High 
Court has the power,  
… in its discretion, and at the instance of any interested person, to enquire 
into, and determine any existing, future or contingent right or obligation, 
notwithstanding that such person cannot claim any relief consequential upon 
a determination.  
It was held in a number of cases relating to section 102 of the General Laws 
Amendment Act 46 of 1935 that the court will not under that section deal 
with or pronounce upon abstract or academic points of law and that there 
must be an "existing and concrete dispute between persons, albeit as to 
future and contingent rights", before the court will act.97 However, Van 
Loggerenberg points out that the decision in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Ex parte Nell98 reflects a marked departure from this view. It was held that 
an existing dispute is not a prerequisite to an exercise by the court of 
jurisdiction under the section; and it is only necessary that there are 
                                            
94  Nedbank Ltd v Mateman; Nedbank Ltd v Stringer 2008 4 SA 276 (T). Also see Van 
Heerden 2008 TSAR 840; Roestoff and Coetzee 2008 THRHR 678; and Otto 2017 
THRHR 140. See further Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank v Maboja (ZAGPPHC) 
(unreported) case number 59378/2012 of 9 October 2014.  
95  Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A-126. See also Geldenhuys 
and Neethling v Beuthin 1918 AD 426 430-441; Softex Matress (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal 
Mattress and Furnishing Co Ltd 1979 1 SA 755 (D) 757D (hereafter the Softex case); 
Preston v Vredendal Co-operative Winery Ltd 2001 1 SA 244 (E). 
96  Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. This power was previously contained in s 19(1)(a)(iii) 
of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
97  Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A-126. Also see Ex parte 
Ginsberg 1936 TPD 155; Maitland Cattle Dealers v Lyons 1943 WLD 1; SA 
Breweries v Registrar of Deeds 1943 CPD 433; Ex parte Morris 1954 3 SA 153 (W); 
and Ex parte Velkes 1963 3 SA 584 (C). 
98  Ex parte Nell 1963 1 SA 754 (A) 760A-C. 
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interested parties upon whom the declaratory order will be binding.99 The 
necessity of an actual dispute is not expressly required in the section, nor is 
it to be implied therefrom. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, and of the differences between section 21 of the Superior Courts 
Act 10 of 2013 and section 102 of the General Laws Amendment Act 46 of 
1935, Van Loggerenberg remarks that earlier decisions relating to the power 
of the court to grant declaratory orders should be used with 
circumspection.100 
In conferring the power to make a declaratory order upon the High Court, 
the legislature has done so without "altering the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court in respect of the subject matter or territory or parties".101 In the Softex 
case, it is pointed out that neither the General Laws Amendment Act 1935 
nor the repealed Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 contained any indication as 
to which provincial or local division may grant a declaratory order in a 
particular case and that the question can be determined only in accordance 
with common law principles. Van Loggerenberg remarks that section 
21(1)(c)102 of the Superior Courts Act is worded materially the same as 
section 19(1)(a)(iii)103 of the repealed Supreme Court Act and it would 
therefore seem that jurisdiction will be established if there is a sufficient 
connecting factor between the court and the matter before it – to enable the 
court to deal with the claim and to give a judgment, which will be res judicata 
between the parties.104 
Notably, all interested parties should be joined in an application for a 
declaration of rights. Although it may be competent for a division of the High 
                                            
99  Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A-126. 
100  Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A-126. 
101  Graaf-Reinet Municipality v Van Ryneveld's Pass Irrigation Board 1950 2 SA 420 (A) 
425, cited with approval in the Softex case 757E. 
102  "A Division has jurisdiction over all persons residing or being in, and in relation to all 
causes arising and all offences triable within, its area of jurisdiction and all other 
matters of which it may according to law take cognisance, and has the power- (c) in 
its discretion, and at the instance of any interested person, to enquire into and 
determine any existing, future or contingent right or obligation, notwithstanding that 
such person cannot claim any relief consequential upon the determination." 
103  "Persons over whom and matters in relation to which provincial and local divisions 
have jurisdiction- (1)(a) A provincial or local division shall have jurisdiction over all 
persons residing or being in and in relation to all causes arising and all offences 
triable within its area of jurisdiction and all other matters of which it may according 
to law take cognizance, and shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), in 
addition to any powers orjurisdiction which may be vested in it by law, have power- 
(iii) in its discretion, and at the instance of any interested person, to enquire into and 
determine any existing, future or contingent right or obligation, notwithstanding that 
such person cannot claim any relief consequential upon the determination." 
104  Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A-126. 
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Court to make a declaratory order in any particular case, Van Loggerenberg 
emphasises that the granting thereof is dependent upon the judicial exercise 
by that division of its discretion with due regard to the circumstances of the 
matter before it. There can be no proper exercise of such discretion if the 
essential elements for a declaratory are not fulfilled. In Cordiant Trading CC 
v Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (Pty) Ltd105 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal held that an application for a declaratory order requires a two stage 
approach: 
a) firstly, the court must be satisfied that the applicant has an interest in 
an existing, future or contingent right or obligation; and 
b) secondly, if the court is satisfied that such an interest exists, it must 
be considered whether or not the order should be granted. 
It is also important to note that the availability of another remedy does not 
render the granting of a declaratory order incompetent. Further, Van 
Loggerenberg indicates that the words "[A]t the interest of any interested 
person" have been interpreted to mean that some tangible and justifiable 
advantage to the applicant must be shown; in other words, a proper case 
for a declaratory order is not made out if the result is a decision on a matter 
that is of mere academic interest to the applicant. The right that is the 
subject of application for a declaratory order under the subsection must 
attach to the applicant or plaintiff and not be a declaration of someone else's 
rights.106 Notably, the Gauteng Division of the High Court recently held in 
Minister of Finance v Oakbay Investments (Pty) Ltd; Oakbay Investments 
(Pty) Ltd v Director of the Financial Intelligence Centre107 that Ex Parte Nell 
did not render declaratory orders justified in all cases where there is no live 
dispute. It held that post Ex Parte Nell, the absence of a live dispute remains 
a factor to be considered where the legal position to be determined is 
uncertain. 
However, it is submitted that a request by a consumer to be declared no 
longer over-indebted and no longer under debt review cannot be 
accommodated under the High Court's powers to issue declaratory orders, 
because it does not concern a declaration regarding rights and obligations 
as envisaged by section 21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act. Furthermore, 
                                            
105  Cordiant Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (Pty) Ltd 2005 6 SA 205 
(SCA) 231E-G. Also see Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A2-
128. 
106  Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A2-128. 
107  Minister of Finance v Oakbay Investments (Pty) Ltd; Oakbay Investments (Pty) Ltd 
v Director of the Financial Intelligence Centre 2018 3 SA 515 (GP) para 61. 
CM VAN HEERDEN & H COETZEE PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 34 
 
the general power of the High Court to make a declaratory order, as 
contemplated in section 21(1)(c), should not be confused with the special 
jurisdiction bestowed on High Courts to be approached by the NCR in terms 
of section 16(b)(ii) by applying to a court for a declaratory order "on the 
interpretation or application of any provision" of the NCA. In the context at 
hand, there is no specific provision in the Act that facilitates an exit from the 
debt review process where a debt restructuring order is in place other than 
under the circumstances provided for in section 71. As explained above, 
there simply exists no other provision in the Act that can be interpreted to 
facilitate such an exit – not expressly and also not by necessary implication. 
A High Court would at most be able to "declare" that there is a lacuna in the 
Act that needs to be addressed by the legislature. That is of course, if the 
argument can be justified that these type of consumers, whose financial 
situation has improved but who do not yet meet the requirements of section 
71, should indeed be allowed to exit the debt review procedure once it has 
been formalised by means of a court order but not yet completed as 
envisaged by section 71. 
However, to again take the stance of a devil's advocate, even if a High Court 
could declare a consumer to be "not over-indebted", the impediment 
remains that such an order addresses only one part of the problem, given 
that it may be argued that such a declaration does not automatically imply 
that the debt restructuring order granted by the Magistrate's Court is 
rescinded. The next question would then be whether it is possible for the 
High Court to set aside the restructuring order granted by the Magistrate's 
Court, because it will clearly not help the consumer out of his predicament 
if he receives an order by the High Court declaring him to be "not over-
indebted", but in reality he remains subject to a debt restructuring order by 
a Magistrate's Court. In this respect it is important to be reminded that a 
High Court is not at liberty to tamper with Magistrates' Court judgments and 
orders and has no general power to set aside such judgments and orders. 
A High Court can set aside a Magistrate's Court judgment only if such a 
judgment is taken on appeal108 or review109 or arguably if another piece of 
legislation, as a lex specialis, gives the High Court the power to do so. Thus, 
it would appear that, in the absence of an appeal or a review against a debt 
restructuring order, the High Court has no general jurisdiction to set aside a 
Magistrate's Court judgment. Accordingly, it would not be competent for the 
                                            
108  Section 83 of the Magistrates' Courts Act read with rule 51 of the Magistrates' Courts 
Rules. Regarding the prosecution of the appeal in the High Court, see Uniform Rules 
of Court 7 and 50. 
109  Section 21(1)(b) read with s 22 of the Superior Courts Act. 
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High Court to set aside the restructuring order made in respect of a 
consumer who claims now to be no longer over-indebted. Some may 
possibly argue that if a High Court can declare a consumer no longer over-
indebted it would have the effect that the debt restructuring order lapses ex 
lege, thus obviating the need for formal rescission of that order. However, 
all these arguments about the rescission of the order or the ex lege lapsing 
thereof are actually of no avail, because the factual position remains that 
the High Court cannot make a declaratory order to remedy the legislative 
failure (if one is of opinion that these consumers should be assisted) to 
provide for exit from debt review between the period since the granting of a 
debt restructuring order but prior to compliance with section 71. 
The NCA is already notorious for containing many drafting errors.110 
However, what we are dealing with here is not a drafting error that can be 
rectified by purposive interpretation or by implying a certain reading of the 
legislative provisions concerned. The factual context here is that no 
provisions exist to accommodate the scenario that causes the challenges in 
practice, and the High Court cannot change this reality by taking on the 
cloak of the legislature. To use the purpose of the Act to extend greater 
protection to credit consumers (if one is of the opinion that these consumers 
must be assisted) to fathom some interpretation that would facilitate an exit 
from debt review in the above circumstances in the absence of a legislative 
provision catering therefore would amount to artificial manipulation of the 
purposes of the Act to absorb legislative failures. 
Is there any other basis on which the High Court can grant relief to 
consumers who wish to withdraw from and exit the debt relief process prior 
to meeting the requirements of section 71? It may possibly be argued that 
a debt restructuring order by a Magistrate's Court, which among other things 
has declared a consumer over-indebted, affects the status of the consumer 
because his contractual capacity is limited by the bar on entering into further 
credit agreements and that the High Court may assume jurisdiction based 
on the fact that it is the forum that generally deals with status issues. But it 
                                            
110  See for instance Brits, Coetzee and Van Heerden 2017 THRHR 177 and Brits 2015 
De Jure 75, as well as cases referred to therein, in relation to the interpretational 
difficulties that resulted from lax drafting in respect of reinstatement of credit 
agreements. Although the 2014 Amendment Act strived to improve the situation, it 
is still not resolved. Another example of careless drafting is that s 130(4)(a) and s 
83(2)(a) still merely refers to "the court" within the context of reckless credit, although 
the NCA's reckless credit provisions were amended, by the 2014 Amendment Act, 
to also afford jurisdiction to the Tribunal in such respect. A  further example is that of 
s 130(1)(a) that originally referred to s 86(9), where it ought to have referred to s 
86(10). The latter error was rectified by the 2014 Amendment Act. 
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should further be borne in mind that the High Court's jurisdiction to deal with 
status matters is generally founded in legislation such as the Divorce Act111 
and the Insolvency Act.112 Although the High Court's jurisdiction is not 
ousted in respect of matters to which the NCA applies, it has been pointed 
out that there is no specific provision in the NCA that states that the High 
Court can be approached for an order to declare a consumer "not over-
indebted" in the specific context under discussion. 
As a last resort, it may be asked whether it would be possible for the High 
Court to use its inherent jurisdiction to assist consumers who wish to 
withdraw from debt review. In terms of section 173 of the Constitution,113 
the High Court has the inherent power to protect and regulate its own 
process and to develop the common law, taking into account the interests 
of justice.114 Although the High Court possesses inherent jurisdiction,115 
such inherent jurisdiction does not extend to a High Court the ability to hear 
status matters in the absence of enabling legislation. The inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court has a very specific scope, namely that it 
concerns the jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of its processes and to 
develop the common law.  
It is accordingly submitted that, in the absence of any enabling legislation 
(such as the NCA), which indicates that the High Court may be approached 
for an order declaring a consumer to be "not over-indebted" and that the 
consumer is "no longer under debt review", a High Court will not be able to 
rely on its power to make a declaratory order or on its inherent jurisdiction 
as a basis for dealing with the types of applications under discussion. 
Finding a solution to the problematic situation of consumers who have 
applied for debt review and whose financial situation has subsequently 
improved, although not to the extent that they qualify for a clearance 
certificate as per section 71, appears to be quite a challenge. This is also 
                                            
111  Divorce Act 70 of 1979. 
112  Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
113  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
114  Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A-126. Also see Du Plessis v 
De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC); Gardener v Whitaker 1996 4 SA 337 (CC); Philips v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 1 SA 505 (CC); South African 
Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 1 SA 523 
(CC); and Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Department of Roads and Transport, 
Eastern Cape (No 2) 2009 6 SA 589 (SCA) 606D. 
115  See Universal City Studios Inc v Network Video (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 734 (A) 754G 
(hereafter the Universal City Studios Inc case), where the Appellate Division (as it 
then was) remarked: "There is no doubt that the Supreme Court possesses an 
inherent reservoir of power to regulate its procedures in the interest of the proper 
administration of justice" [Emphasis added]. 
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illustrated by the significant number of cases which grappled with this issue 
on a wide continuum of attempts to exit debt review. 
5  The case-maze 
The problem relating to consumers who wish to be declared "no longer over-
indebted" was thrust into the spotlight in Magadze v ADCAP, Ndlovu v 
Koekemoer.116 In this case the applicants sought an order declaring them 
to be no longer over-indebted, no longer under debt review, requiring the 
relevant credit bureau to remove their debt review status from their credit 
reports and also that the respective debt counsellors provide the form 17.W, 
confirming that the applicants have been declared no longer over-indebted. 
The court indicated that the ultimate question was whether the amendment 
to section 71 by the 2014 Amendment Act would have the same effect as 
the court granting an order that the applicants are no longer over-indebted 
and that the credit bureau removes the debt review status from the credit 
reports. In both applications, the consumers had applied for debt review and 
Form 17.2 had been sent out. However, debt restructuring orders were not 
made. The consumers had subsequently paid off two of their creditors and 
stated that their financial circumstances had improved significantly since 
their applications to be declared over-indebted and that as a result thereof, 
they were able to afford to increase the total monthly amount payable to 
their creditors in terms of the debt restructuring order. The applicants further 
indicated that all their creditors received notice of the current applications 
and that none of them objected. Accordingly, they wished to "terminate the 
debt review process" and pay their creditors directly. However, they were 
advised that a debt counsellor does not have the power to terminate or 
withdraw the debt review process.117 
The court among other things indicated that a "Form 17.2 was already 
issued and thus it is too late for applicants to withdraw from the debt review 
process".118 The court subsequently referred to Rougier v Nedbank Ltd, 
noting that Rougier had been decided before the amendment of section 71 
by the 2014 Amendment Act. The court dealt briefly with the amendments 
to section 71, pointing out again that the question was whether a clearance 
certificate, as contemplated in section 71, has the same effect as the court 
                                            
116  Magadze v ADCAP, Ndlovu v Koekemoer (GP) (unreported) case number 
57186/2016 of 2 November 2016 (hereafter the Magadze case). 
117  Magadze case paras 1-5. 
118  Magadze case para 6.1. Emphasis added. 
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order envisaged in section 88(1) of the Act.119 The court indicated (and 
subsequently held) that, in its view, section 71 does not confer any new 
powers on the debt counsellor to release the consumer from debt review 
and that all it does is inform the creditors that the consumer is now able to 
meet his monthly obligations, while the clearance certificate may expunge 
from the consumer's record any default in respect of a particular credit 
agreement. It does not appear to expunge from the consumer's record the 
fact that the consumer (previously) successfully applied to be placed under 
debt review.120 It pointed out that this has adverse implications for all future 
transactions the consumers seek to enter into. The court further pointed out 
that section 88(1)121 does not have a provision similar to section 71(5) 
regarding the expunging of credit bureaus records. Thus, it would create an 
anomalous position where a Form 17.W, being a form issued by the NCR 
titled "Withdrawal from Debt Review", is issued pursuant to a court order 
and the credit bureau did not expunge the consumer's records in toto. The 
court remarked that to grant an order that falls short of failing to expunge 
the consumer's credit record in toto would effectively mean that section 71 
would carry more weight than an order issued by the High Court and such 
a situation would be untenable. It stated that, in any event, it was of the view 
that a court has "wide powers" to grant the order sought to expunge the 
records of the consumer, given the specific facts set out in the applications, 
indicating that the consumers are no longer over-indebted and are in a 
position to pay their creditors. Thus, the court declared both applicants to 
be no longer over-indebted and no longer under debt review. Further, the 
court ordered that the credit bureaus remove the applicants’ debt review 
status from their credit records and that the debt counsellor provide a Form 
17.W to the relevant creditors, to inform them that the applicants had been 
declared no longer over-indebted and no longer under debt review.122 
Subsequently, in Mokubung v Mamela Consulting,123 an unopposed 
application served before the Gauteng High Court also for an order 
declaring the applicant to be no longer over-indebted. The court stated that 
neither the Act nor the NCR's Withdrawal Guidelines lends authority to the 
debt counsellor to reverse a commenced debt review process. It further 
stated that a Magistrate's Court, being a creature of statute, has no authority 
                                            
119  Although the court spoke of s 88(1) of the Act, it was clear from the underlining in 
the quoted subsection that she was referring to s 88(1)(b) specifically. 
120  Magadze case paras 8-15. 
121  It appears that the court meant s 88(1)(b) of the Act specifically. 
122  Magadze case paras 16-21. 
123  Mokubung v Mamela Consulting (GPP) (unreported) case number 87653/2016 of 14 
June 2017 (hereafter the Mokubung case). 
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to grant the order envisaged in the Withdrawal Guidelines. However, the 
court held that in line with the Guidelines and using its "inherent reservoir of 
power to regulate procedures in the interest of the proper administration of 
justice", the High Court has the necessary powers to grant relief in deserving 
circumstances.124 Therefore, the court declared the consumer "to be no 
longer over-indebted". A similar order was made by the same judge in 
Manamela v Du Plessis t/a Debt Safe.125 
Thereafter, three unopposed matters dealing with applications to be 
declared no longer over-indebted were heard in the KZN Division of the High 
Court in Pietermaritzburg and similar judgments were delivered in all three 
cases. The facts of these matters differ slightly. In Less v Vosloo126 the 
applicant had applied for debt review in March 2013. No proof was furnished 
to the court regarding the dispatch of a Form 17.1 or a Form 17.2 and 
apparently no restructuring order was in existence. The applicant alleged 
that she had paid off certain credit providers, as listed in her affidavit, and 
was making direct payments to the "outside credit providers", as also listed 
in her affidavit.127 The applicant further alleged that she was being 
prejudiced, because she could not apply for a "rental agreement, etc."128 
The court remarked that it was not possible to determine whether the direct 
payments that had been made were adequate, alternatively how much less 
they were than they actually should have been, and whether the credit 
providers had accepted these payments. Accordingly, the court stated that 
it could not be determined whether the applicant was still over-indebted or 
not. The court indicated that due to the conclusion it had reached it was not 
necessary to decide this issue.129 
This was quite a lengthy judgment, but the gist of the court's reasoning was 
that the debt restructuring had never been confirmed by any court in terms 
of section 87(1) of the NCA, nor was any restructuring agreement between 
all the parties attached to the papers. The court referred to Nedbank v 
National Credit Regulator130 where it was held that a debt counsellor, as a 
statutory functionary, is obliged, consequent to reviewing a consumer's debt 
                                            
124  Mokubung case paras 4 and 5 relying on the Universal City Studios Inc case. 
125  Manamela v Du Plessis t/a Debt Safe (GPP) (unreported) case number 78244/2016 
of 21 June 2017 (hereafter the Manamela case). 
126  Less v Vosloo (KZP) (unreported) case number 7520/17P of 22 September 2017 
(hereafter the Less case). 
127  Less case paras 1 and 2. The paid off creditors were listed in para 7 of her affidavit 
and the "outside creditors" were listed in para 11 thereof. 
128  Less case para 4. It appears that she was referring to a lease of property. 
129  Less case para 5. 
130  Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator (SCA). 
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in terms of section 86, to refer a proposal to the Magistrate's Court to make 
certain orders, failing which he has not complied with his duty as a debt 
counsellor. Further, the court remarked that it was clear from the Nedbank-
case that there must be judicial oversight to declaring a person over-
indebted and restructuring his debt. It pointed out that, until the Magistrate's 
Court has made an order approving the over indebtedness and 
restructuring, "no declaration of over-indebtedness has occurred." The court 
further stated that131  
Form 17.2 used by the debt counsellor does not reflect the correct position as 
it fails to incorporate the judicial oversight required and that any application for 
over indebtedness and restructuring must be approved by the Magistrate's 
Court. Form 17.2 is also incorrect in stating that the application for debt review 
was successful. 
The court stated that the debt counsellor is obliged to obtain information 
from the consumer, assess the application, prepare a restructuring of the 
debt and draft the necessary application to the Magistrate's Court. It 
remarked as follows:132  
In my view a period of 90 days from the date of the application for a declaration 
of over indebtedness by the consumer to the debt counsellor should be 
sufficient to do so and to issue and serve the application at the relevant court 
for its decision. If this is not done, the consumer cannot be prejudiced and wait 
indefinitely for the debt counsellor to comply. The consumer and credit 
providers are being prejudiced, as there is no valid debt rescheduling because 
the magistrates court has not approved such and made no order. 
The court indicated that the intention of the NCA is to ensure that consumers 
who are over-indebted receive the necessary assistance within a 
reasonable time and indicated that they are in the majority of cases already 
in a vulnerable position. It further stated that, if the debt counsellor fails to 
issue and serve the application at the Magistrate's Court within 90 days after 
receiving the application, the consumer if he so wishes must after the expiry 
of the 90 days be able to "stop the whole process". It remarked that the 
consumer can in such a situation, at any time before the application is 
issued and filed at the Magistrate's Court, inform the debt counsellor that he 
must not proceed with the application. The debt counsellor must then inform 
the credit bureau to remove the name of the consumer from all its records.133 
However, the court held that, because no application for a declaration of 
over-indebtedness and restructuring by a Magistrate's Court had been 
                                            
131  Less case paras 8.1-8.4. Emphasis added.  
132  Less case paras 13.3.1 and 13.3.2. 
133  Less case para 13.5. 
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instituted in the matter at hand, there had not been any valid declaration of 
over-indebtedness. Hence, the applicant's application could not be granted. 
Similar applications were heard by the same judge in Mholongo v Beatrice 
De Beer134 and Ngcongo v Neil Roets trading as Debt Rescue.135 In the 
Mhlongo-case, the applicant had applied for debt review in September 
2013. A Form 17.2 was sent out, but no application was made to court for a 
declaration of over-indebtedness and for a debt restructuring order. The 
applicant indicated what the amounts of her initial indebtedness were at the 
time that the Form 17.2 was sent out by the debt counsellor.136 She also 
detailed her current monthly net salary and her current total expenditure, 
indicating that she was left with a "surplus" of approximately R3 300. She 
indicated that she had paid off all her debt (11 credit agreements) listed in 
the agreement, except debt owing to African Bank, which she was repaying 
at R1 000 per month. She also produced settlement letters for two of these 
accounts, but not for the eight others. However, the court was not satisfied 
that sufficient evidence had been presented in support of the consumer's 
allegation that she was no longer over-indebted.137 Subsequently, the court 
employed the exact same reasoning as in Less v Vosloo and its judgment 
is a verbatim repeat of the aforesaid judgment, resulting in the dismissal of 
the application. 
In the Ngcongo-case, the applicant had applied for debt review on 23 April 
2016. A Form 17.1 and a Form 17.2 were issued on the same day. However, 
no application to be declared over-indebted and to have the consumer's 
debt restructured was submitted to court. The applicant made certain 
allegations regarding payments to his creditors, but did not provide sufficient 
information in that respect. Consequently, the court was not satisfied with 
the evidence presented. The applicant provided neither any indication as to 
how much was paid to each creditor nor how much was owing. Among other 
things, the court pointed out that the applicant's affidavit failed to set out 
how the applicant's payments had been restructured by the debt counsellor. 
Further, there was no indication as to what the exact amounts were that had 
to be repaid monthly to each credit provider and whether the applicant was 
in a position to pay them. Also, if he was not, whether the credit providers 
                                            
134  Mhlongo v Beatrice De Beer 2018 JOL 39571 (KZP) (22 September 2017) (hereafter 
the Mhlongo case). 
135  Ngcongo v Neil Roets trading as Debt Rescue 2018 JOL 39572 (KZP) (22 
September 2017) (hereafter the Ngcongo case). 
136  Mhlongo case para 3. This information indeed corresponded with the information 
listed in the Form 17.2. 
137  Mhlongo case paras 4-7. 
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were in agreement to accept any other amount. Also, there was neither an 
indication that the applicant had in actual fact contacted his credit providers, 
nor that they had agreed to accept any other payment. Likewise, there was 
no demonstration that these payments were less than the actual monthly 
payments.138 Thus, the court stated that on this basis alone the application 
had to fail, but that for the reasons set out later (similar to the reason given 
in Less v Vosloo) it would not be necessary to determine this issue.139 The 
court further pointed out that the procedure by the debt counsellor, to send 
Form 17.1 and Form 17.2 on the same day, was incorrect.140 Thereafter, 
the remainder of the court's reasoning and judgment were basically a 
verbatim repeat of the judgment in Less v Vosloo, with the result that the 
court eventually dismissed the application. 
In Daniels v Sensational Debt Relief (Pty) Ltd,141 the applicant was placed 
under debt review, where after the debt counsellor restructured the 
applicant's debt. Although the matter was never referred to court to 
formalise the debt review in the form of an order, it seems that the applicant 
abided by the plan and paid the bulk of his credit agreement debt. After 
some time his financial position improved and he wished to exit the debt 
review procedure. On 3 August 2017 the applicant brought an application 
to the Western Cape High Court, which was unopposed. The court found 
no direct ground in the NCA on which the Magistrate's Court can declare a 
consumer no longer over-indebted where the court has not declared the 
consumer over-indebted or placed the consumer under debt review. 
However, the court drew on section 169 of the Constitution to make the 
following: that the applicant is no longer over-indebted, that the applicant is 
no longer under debt review, that the debt counsellor issue a clearance 
certificate and that credit bureaus remove the debt review status from the 
applicant's record. 
In Du Toit v Sager142 the consumer also approached the Western Cape High 
Court to be declared no longer over-indebted. In this matter the consumer 
had also applied for debt review, but no debt restructuring order had been 
                                            
138  Mhlongo case paras 3.1-3.3. 
139  Mhlongo case paras 3.4-3.7. 
140  Mhlongo case para 4. The court referred to reg 24(10) and stated: "Section (sic) 
24(10) provides that after completion of an assessment the debt counsellor sends 
Form 17.2 to the credit bureaus. How could this have been done when the credit 
providers were not given any opportunity to respond as both Forms 17.1 and 17.2 
were sent on the same day?" 
141  Daniels v Sensational Debt Relief (Pty) Ltd (WC) (unreported) case number 
10065/17 of 3 August 2017. 
142  Du Toit v Sager (WC) (unreported) case number 16226/17 of 17 November 2017 
(hereafter the Du Toit case). 
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applied for at any time thereafter.143 The consumer alleged that he had 
settled all his debts with his credit providers, except his instalment sale 
agreement with the sixth respondent, and that his financial circumstances 
had significantly improved. It was argued on behalf of the consumer that the 
court must use its inherent jurisdiction to make the requested order. This 
was because there were circumstances where a person has not paid off all 
his debts, and therefore could not get a clearance certificate, although he 
was no longer over-indebted. Hence, there was a lacuna in the NCA.144 The 
court's attention was drawn to the unreported judgment in Daniels-case. 
The court agreed with the judge in the Daniels-case that145  
… the NCA does not expressly empower the Magistrate's Court to declare a 
consumer no longer over-indebted after a section 86(1) application has been 
filed and a Form 17.2 has been issued, where the consumer has settled 
liabilities to the point that he or she is no longer over-indebted, in 
circumstances in which the court has not declared the consumer over-
indebted, or placed the consumer under debt review.  
The court subsequently stated that, in its view, there are different paths of 
travel that a person under debt review, who was aggrieved by a report to a 
credit bureau and the information it held in relation to the debt review, can 
take. The first path is to obtain a clearance certificate in terms of section 71. 
The court remarked that refusal by a debt counsellor to provide a consumer 
with a clearance certificate "is not a matter nor is it circumstances in which 
the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court should be visited upon". Here, the 
applicant should apply directly to the Tribunal to review the decision of the 
debt counsellor. The second path available to the consumer is to challenge 
the credit information in accordance with section 72(1)(c). The third path is 
to request the NCR to investigate a complaint regarding disputed 
information held by a credit bureau. Therefore, the court did not agree with 
the applicant's counsel that the NCA's silence in respect of a process to 
have a person declared no longer over-indebted by a Magistrate's Court is 
a lacuna in the Act.146 It thus dismissed the application, among others 
indicating that the High Court is not the forum of first instance on matters 
that both the Tribunal and the Magistrate's Courts should deal with. 
                                            
143  It appears that a Form 17.1 was sent out but it is unclear whether a Form 17.2 was 
sent out by the debt counsellor. 
144  Du Toit case paras 3-6. The debt counsellor did not participate in the proceedings 
as he alleged that the debt review process had been suspended by virtue of the 
consumer's non-payment of debt counselling fees. 
145  Daniels case para 7. The court's attention was also drawn to the judgment in the 
Magadze case (as discussed above). 
146  Daniels case paras 9-22. 
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Subsequently, in the Phaladi case application was made again to the 
Western Cape High Court for an order that the consumers were no longer 
over-indebted. The applicants had applied for debt review and a voluntary 
re-arrangement had been agreed with their credit providers, to which they 
had adhered. No debt restructuring order had been applied for. The 
applicants claimed that they were "now financially sound and in a position 
to demonstrate that they are able to punctiliously fulfil their outstanding 
obligations". 
Thus, they contended that it would be "reasonable" in the circumstances for 
their records at the credit bureaus to be expunged so that they would be 
enabled to responsibly incur additional obligations by entering into fresh 
credit agreements in the ordinary course of events.147 One of the applicants 
also alleged that her negative credit status had a potential adverse effect on 
her job applications and thus on her career advancement.148  
Binns-Ward J remarked that the question that arose was whether it was "at 
all within the power of the (high) court" to grant the applicants the relief that 
they sought. He referred to Du Toit v Sager, the Magadze case, the 
Mokubung case and the Manamela case as discussed above. He pointed 
out that in the Magadze case the court failed to indicate the source of the 
"wide powers" it relied upon to grant the declaration that the consumers 
were not over-indebted any longer.149 Disagreeing with the judgments in 
Mokubung and Manamela, Binns-Ward J indicated that the inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked to grant the relief sought, 
among other reasons because in the area of law regulated by statute, the 
High Court is under a duty to interpret and apply legislative enactments in a 
manner that promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. He 
stated that150 
… in striving to do so it cannot by procrustean construction do violence to the 
language used by the legislature. Its powers do not extend in improving 
legislation by providing measures or remedies that the statutory enactments 
do not afford, merely because the court considers it would [be] just or equitable 
should they afford it. 
Binns-Ward J indicated that to purport to do so would in effect be to assume 
a legislative function and thereby impinge impermissibly on the domain of 
                                            
147  The case does not indicate whether Forms 17.1 and 17.2 were sent out, but given 
that a voluntary arrangement was in place it can be assumed that the said forms 
were sent out. 
148  Phaladi case para 2. 
149  Phaladi case paras 4-7. 
150  Phaladi case para 8. 
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the legislative branch of government. He remarked that the powers 
exercisable in terms of section 172 of the Constitution, to read down or read 
in provisions to render legislation constitutionally compatible, or to provide 
just and equitable interim relief following a declaration of constitutional 
incompatibility, are quite distinguishable, as is the approach of courts to 
strictly or narrowly interpret legislation that limits or curbs common law 
rights. Accordingly, he stated that151  
[a]ny contemplation of the width of the superior courts powers that fails to 
acknowledge and respect these limitations of their bounds is likely to lead to 
a fundamentally misconceived conception of their actual extent and, if by 
judges, can result in their being exceeded. 
Binns-Ward J further remarked that the notions of over-indebtedness 
contemplated by section 86(7)(c) and the associated remedy of "debt 
review" within the auspices of the Act152 
… have no foundation in the common law. They are statutory creations. How 
they work is governed entirely by the NCA and, in the absence of a challenge 
to their constitutionality, the courts' powers in respect of them are delineated 
by the provisions of the enactment. 
Binns-Ward J indicated that the disabilities that follow for an allegedly over-
indebted consumer after he has applied to a debt counsellor for debt review 
are regulated in the first instance by sections 88(1) and (2) of the NCA.153 
He stated that the effect of section 88 appears to be that consumers are 
prohibited from entering into any fresh agreements, apart from a 
consolidation agreement, until they have fulfilled all their obligations under 
the existing credit agreements as rearranged. He indicated that such an 
effect is "ameliorated" by the provisions of section 71 as amended. He 
further stated that it is clear that section 71(2) in its original form was entirely 
congruent with section 88(1)(c) and 88(2). He remarked that the evident 
intention in replacing section 71(2)'s original content with the amended 
wording was to enable consumers who had made debt review applications 
to achieve the expungement of the record of their debt rearrangement 
orders or agreements, once they had fulfilled all their obligations in respect 
of those credit agreements that were not mortgage agreements or long-term 
agreements. However, he indicated that the legislature might have made 
matters clearer had it also amended section 88 when it made changes to 
section 71. In his view, the legislature's failure to also amend section 88 had 
given rise to a tension between the two provisions. Further, he indicated that 
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if the applicants had fulfilled all their restructured credit agreements and 
encountered problems in obtaining a clearance certificate, their remedy was 
to approach the Tribunal, which entailed an administrative process. He 
remarked that154 
[a]s pointed out by Thulare AJ in the Du Toit case, the role of the High Court 
in the legislative scheme is limited to dealing with judicial reviews of, or 
appeals from the Tribunal: see section 148(2) of the NCA. The NCA does not 
afford the High Court jurisdiction to deal at first instance with matters falling 
within the province of the Tribunal. 
Notably, in this case the counsel for the applicants sought to rely on section 
88(1)(b)155 of the NCA and paragraph 4.2 of the NCR Explanatory Note. 
Binns-Ward J remarked that the NCR is obviously bound by the Act and its 
published opinions, bearing on the interpretation of the Act, are expressly 
acknowledged in section 16(1)(b) to be non-binding. With regard to 
counsel's reliance on section 88(1)(b) the court stated that156  
… it is clear, if the provision is read contextually, that it does not contemplate 
an application to the Magistrate's Court for declaring an already established 
state of over-indebtedness to have come to an end, nor does it contemplate 
an application to end debt review pursuant to an agreed debt rearrangement 
pursuant to a recommendation in terms of section 86(7)(b). Indeed, having 
regard to the provisions of section 71 such a procedure would be superfluous. 
As mentioned, the legislative scheme is that the lifting of the consumer's 
disabilities attendant on debt review occurs by way of an administrative, not a 
judicial, process. Having regard to what is entailed that seems to me to be 
entirely fitting. Whilst acknowledging that the separation of powers does not 
give rise to a hermetic compartmentalisation, it would, in my view, have been 
an inappropriate allocation of constitutional functions to give the courts a 
surrogate role in the administrative framework of national credit regulation 
structures. The appeal/review role accorded to the High Court in terms of 
section 148(1) is by contrast, constitutionally appropriate. 
The court then turned to the NCR's Explanatory Note and remarked that it 
postulated an application’s being made in terms of section 87(1)(a) of the 
NCA. However, the court pointed out that section 87(1)(a) does not make 
provision for an application, but merely acknowledges the magistrate's 
power to refuse such an application. Binns-Ward J remarked that section 
87(1)(a),157  
                                            
154  Phaladi case para 17. 
155 As indicated above, s 88(1)(b) of the Act determines that the consumer may not 
enter into new credit agreements until "the court has determined that the consumer 
is not over-indebted, or has rejected a debt counsellor's proposal or the consumers 
application". 
156  Phaladi case para 20. Emphasis added. 
157  Phaladi case para 26. 
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… provides for a negative response by the court to the application before it. It 
is to that provision that section 88(1)(b) effectively cross-references. The Act 
most certainly does not contemplate an application to the Magistrate's Court 
for a declaration that the consumer is not over-indebted. Any such declaration 
would require a positive response to an application for which the Act makes 
no provision. Once a debt review had been confirmed, whether by way of court 
order in terms of section 87(1)(b) or by voluntary debt rearrangement in terms 
of section 86(8)(a), the only way to end its effect is in terms of section 71 read 
with section 88(1)(c). There is no halfway house. 
Thus, the court concluded that the NCA "just does not make provision for 
the sort of application conjured in paragraph 4.2 of the Explanatory Note".158 
Binns-Ward J subsequently indicated that, for the interpretation of section 
88(1)(b) contended by the applicants' counsel to be able to apply, the 
phrase "the court had determined that the consumer is not over-indebted" 
would require to be read as "the court has determined that the consumer is 
no longer over-indebted", thereby necessitating the deletion of the word 
"not" and its replacement with "no longer". To deal with the review following 
on an agreed debt rearrangement, in terms of section 86(7)(b), it would have 
to contain the wording "has determined that the consumer is no longer 
subject to the effects of debt review" or other words to that effect. Binns-
Ward J stated that159  
[i]t is well established that in this context words cannot be read into a statute 
unless the implication is a necessary one in the sense that without it effect 
cannot be given to the statute as it stands. 
The court stated that the unambiguous effect of the NCA is that an over-
indebted or financially challenged consumer who enters into a debt 
rearrangement agreement can terminate the debt review only by settling his 
or her obligations to the extent required in terms of section 71 and 
demonstrating that he or she has satisfied the other requirements of section 
71(1)(b).160 
In a last attempt to obtain some relief for his clients, the applicants' counsel 
asked only for declaratory relief, "shorn of any direction as to the 
expungement of the records of the credit bureaux". He argued that the court 
should come to the applicant's assistance, exercising its power in terms of 
section 21(1)(c) of the Superior Courts Act. However, Binns-Ward J stated 
that it would be inappropriate to make such a declaration in the environment 
                                            
158  Phaladi case para 24. 
159  Phaladi case para 21.  
160  Phaladi case para 21. 
CM VAN HEERDEN & H COETZEE PER / PELJ 2019 (22) 48 
 
regulated by the NCA, while the applicants are still properly recorded in 
terms of the Act as being the subjects of debt reviews. He remarked that161  
[t]he applicants resort to this court was therefore misconceived. They are 
limited to the relief provided for in terms of section 71 of the NCA, and can 
seek it only in the manner therein set out. To the extent that they do not qualify 
for relief under that provision, they are remediless. The courts are not 
empowered to craft a remedy that the statute does not allow for. In my view 
therefore the orders made in the Gauteng Division judgments mentioned 
earlier should not have been granted. 
In Eseu v Debtsafe; Shingange v Mare trading as Debt Rescue,162 four 
matters relating to applications to be declared "not over-indebted" served 
before the Gauteng Provincial Division of the High Court. It was alleged that, 
subsequent to being placed under debt review, all the applicants had 
proceeded to settle some of their accounts due to their financial situation’s 
improving. Accordingly, they wished to terminate the debt review process 
and to pay their credit providers directly, as they alleged that they were 
financially able to afford an increase in the total monthly amounts payable 
to the remaining credit providers.163 Despite the court finding that the 
applicants had not complied with the court rules relating to service of their 
applications and dealing with this issue at length, the court eventually 
remarked:164  
It would result in an injustice if the Court did not assist the applicants as they 
had made out a proper case for the relief sought. All the applicants have 
indicated that they wish to repay their creditors as fast as possible so that they 
can put their debt behind them. I therefore intend granting a rule nisi calling 
upon the respondents [the credit providers] to indicate why a final order should 
not be granted.  
Thus, without going into the issue of whether it was indeed competent for 
the High Court to grant the relief sought, the court issued the aforesaid rule 
nisi with a return date of 24 July 2018.  
In Botha v Koekemoer t/a The Debt Expert 2; Mafakane v MSA Consultants 
t/a Consumer Financial Services,165 the Limpopo High Court subsequently 
                                            
161  Phaladi case para 29. Emphasis added. 
162 Eseu v Debtsafe; Shingange v Mare trading as Debt Rescue (GPP) (unreported) 
case number 85651/2017; 85650/2017 of 10 April 2018 (hereafter the Esau v Debt 
Safe case). 
163  Esau v Debt Safe case para 1. It is not clear whether Forms 17.1 and 17.2 were sent 
or whether any court orders were made. 
164  Esau v Debt Safe case para 17. 
165  Botha v Koekemoer t/a The Debt Expert 2; Mafakane v MSA Consultants t/a 
Consumer Financial Services (LMPP) (unreported) case number 7723/2017; 
750/2018 of 11 May 2018 (hereafter the Botha case). The court in this matter was 
referring to the Manamela case. 
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also had the opportunity to adjudicate on applications to be declared no 
longer over-indebted. The facts were that each of the applicants applied for 
debt review and their debt counsellors sent out Form 17.2 (and obviously 
also Form 17.1). However, no debt restructuring orders had been applied 
for. Nevertheless, the applicants continued to pay their credit providers 
without any objection.166 They alleged that their financial circumstances had 
improved since applying for debt review, and that they were now able to pay 
their debts. Hence, they wished to terminate the debt review process 
instituted by them.167  
In a lengthy judgment the court undertook an analysis of the debt review 
process. The court in particular remarked that until an order in terms of 
section 86(7)(c) is made by a Magistrate's Court "a proposal made by a debt 
counsellor has no legal effect".168 The court indicated that the NCA neither 
expressly allows nor prohibits the withdrawal of an application for debt 
review by the applicant and, among other things, remarked that169   
[t]he fact that no mention is specifically made with regard to the withdrawal of 
an application does not mean that an applicant is unable to withdraw an 
application by means of the debt counsellor. A debt counsellor plays a pivotal 
role in the process once an application is submitted to him/her. The contents 
of the application need to be scrutinized to determine whether it contains the 
prescribed information and it then has to be appraised to make an informed 
decision. If a debt counsellor has made a recommendation such debt 
counsellor is obliged to refer the application within a reasonable time to a court 
for an order.  
In footnote 20 to the judgment the court further remarked that170 
[a] debt counsellor has no discretion to withhold an application from court after 
he has made his recommendation. A court may however consider the 
withdrawal at the hearing. 
The court also remarked that it was in agreement that a debt counsellor may 
not terminate debt review proceedings subsequent to his having made a 
proposal in terms of section 86(7)(c). However, the court was of the view 
that171  
                                            
166  Botha case para 2. It is not clear whether they paid their creditors directly or via the 
debt counsellor or a payment distribution agent. 
167  Botha case para 3. 
168  Botha case para 13. The court stated that "the recommendation simply sets in motion 
a chain of prescribed events which, ultimately may lead to a court determining that 
(sic) an applicant to be overindebted." 
169  Botha case para 18. 
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… it cannot seriously be contended that a court may not take into account that 
an applicant wishes to withdraw the application or that the applicant has 
entered into further credit agreements subsequent to the commencement of 
the debt review proceedings in contravention of section 88(1). A hearing is 
central to debt review proceedings. I cannot think of any reason why a debt 
counsellor cannot place the subsequent wishes of the applicant to withdraw 
the application before the court. A court after considering the reasons for 
withdrawal of the application by the applicant may reject the application in 
terms of section 88(1)(b) for that very reason. The express wording of section 
88(1)(b) is wide enough. 
The court stated that the debt counsellors should have made 
recommendations to a court for an order and remarked that it is172  
… quite unacceptable that debt counsellors who have the responsibility to 
administer the Act callously flout their responsibilities towards the applicants 
and creditors alike without any consequences.  
Thus, the court held that it was173  
… not prepared to issue any declaratory orders as prayed. The applicants 
were at no time declared to be over-indebted by a competent court. In my view 
the applications must be referred to the respective Magistrate's Courts with 
jurisdiction for hearing. All the evidence inclusive of the subsequent events 
must be placed before the court by the debt counsellors with notice to all the 
parties and every credit bureau. 
The court dismissed both applications and ordered that a copy of the 
judgment had to be made available to the NCR and the debt counsellors 
concerned. 
In Ntonto v Chris Craven t/a Zero Debt,174 the Gauteng Provincial Division 
of the High Court again had an opportunity to consider an unopposed 
application by a consumer to be declared no longer over-indebted. The 
applicant had applied for debt review in September 2017, but his financial 
position had since improved. It is unclear from the case whether a debt 
restructuring order was made at any time. The applicant contended that his 
financial position had improved significantly, that one of the rescheduled 
accounts had been settled in full and that he was in a position to increase 
the total monthly amount that he could repay to his creditors. The court 
referred to the contradictory decisions in the Magadze and Mokubung and 
Manamela and Phaladi cases as discussed above. Van der Schyff AJ 
indicated that, in accordance with the principle of stare decisis, she was 
bound to follow the decisions in the Gauteng North Division, unless she was 
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174  Ntonto v Chris Craven t/a Zero Debt (GNP) (unreported) case number 24163/2018 
of 19 September 2018 (hereafter the Ntonto case). 
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of the opinion that they were wrong. However, she remarked that the 
application before her was vague and a proper case had not been made out 
for relief. Hence, she was not going to analyse the NCA, but was going to 
follow the precedent in Gauteng. As the applicant had not attached a 
confirmatory affidavit by the debt counsellor and had provided no detail 
regarding the amounts owed, she held, however, that it was not possible to 
exercise a discretion and make a ruling as to whether the applicant would 
be able to satisfy in a timely manner the obligations under the credit 
agreements to which he was a party. Accordingly, she dismissed the 
application. 
Van der Schyff AJ had another bite at the cherry in Swanepoel v Roets,175 
where the applicants sought an order declaring them no longer over-
indebted. In this matter, a debt restructuring order had indeed been granted 
on 23 January 2013 and the applicants alleged that they had never 
defaulted on the order. They further alleged that they had "voluntarily 
withdrawn" from the debt review process during February 2018 and had 
since continued to pay their credit providers in accordance with the "initial 
agreement" they had had with them prior to applying for the rearrangement 
of their debt.176 They alleged that their financial position had improved and 
they were now able to pay their credit providers, without assistance, as they 
were no longer over-indebted. A confirmatory affidavit by the debt 
counsellor was attached to the application.177 Van Der Schyff AJ referred to 
the NCR Withdrawal Guidelines and to the subsequent Explanatory Note 
and remarked that it was evident that the NCR was of the opinion that a 
consumer could withdraw from the debt review process after a 
rearrangement order had been granted. She referred to paragraph 3 of the 
Explanatory Note and indicated that it was evident that the NCR's stance 
was that the Magistrate's Court is the correct forum to approach for an order 
rescinding a debt rearrangement order. She was of the view "without 
deciding this issue" that, if the NCA provided for the voluntary withdrawal 
from the debt review process after a Magistrate's Court issued a re-
arrangement order, the correct forum to approach was the Magistrate's 
Court. She further indicated that the current application before the High 
Court was not an appeal nor a review application and that she was not 
aware of any authority stating that the High Court has jurisdiction to rescind 
                                            
175  Swanepoel v Roets (GNP) (unreported) case of 23 October 2018 (hereafter the 
Swanepoel case). 
176  Thus, it appears that they were paying larger instalments than the debt restructuring 
order provided for. 
177  Swanepoel case paras 1-5. 
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or set aside an order granted in the Magistrate's Court, unless the 
Magistrate's Court order was appealed against or reviewed.178 
Van der Schyff AJ indicated that it had been argued on behalf of the 
applicants that, akin to the Mokubung case, the High Court must use its 
"inherent reservoir of power to regulate the procedures in the interest of 
proper administration of justice".179 However, she referred to the Phaladi 
case, where it had been explained that the court's inherent jurisdiction, as 
referred to in the Universal City Studios Inc case,180 referred to the court's 
jurisdiction to regulate its own procedures and processes and did not extend 
to181  
… improving legislation by providing measures or remedies that the statutory 
enactments do not afford merely because the court considers it would be just 
and equitable should they be afforded.182 
Van Der Schyff AJ indicated that the court was not in the present matter 
required to deal with the instance where a debt re-arrangement order had 
not been made, because in casu such a debt rearrangement order existed. 
She indicated that such an order could have been made only after the 
Magistrate's Court had conducted a hearing and held that, in the 
circumstances, she was not convinced that a High Court could rescind an 
order (namely, the debt restructuring order) made by the Magistrate's Court. 
Hence, she dismissed the application.183 
6 Observations regarding the contribution of case law  
Although the court indicated (without investigating this issue) that 
withdrawal from debt review is no longer possible after a Form 17.2 has 
been sent out, it is respectfully submitted that the court in the Magadze case 
failed to appreciate the unique nature of the problem at hand, namely that 
section 71 did not find application as the consumers in casu did not meet 
the requirements for a clearance certificate. Also, section 88(1)(b) does not 
cater for an order declaring a consumer not to be over-indebted at any later 
stage, where a consumer's financial position may have improved, but is 
specifically aimed at the situation where a debt counsellor makes his initial 
recommendation to court or where a consumer who has been found by the 
debt counsellor to be not over-indebted brings an application to court as 
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envisaged by section 86(9). In fact, the type of order envisaged in section 
88(1)(b) and the expungement of information regarding a debt review in 
which a clearance certificate was obtained have nothing to do with each 
other. The basis on which the court came to the assistance of the 
consumers in this matter, namely by using the "wide powers" of the High 
Court without providing any explanation in this regard, is also questionable. 
Nevertheless, the Magadze case serves to highlight the plight of consumers 
who require to be declared no longer over-indebted prior to qualifying for a 
clearance certificate. 
The Mokubung and Manamela cases take no further the solution of the 
problem relating to consumers whose financial situation has improved since 
entering the debt review process. This is because the reliance by the court 
on the High Court's inherent jurisdiction appears to be misplaced. 
Less v Vosloo and the similar judgments in the Mhlongo and Ncongo cases 
also do not provide solutions to the issue under discussion. However, these 
cases highlight an important aspect, namely that some debt counsellors fail 
to comply with their obligation to refer debt reviews to court where a 
determination of over-indebtedness has been made, with the effect that no 
formal declaration of over-indebtedness and debt restructuring order is 
made. This is certainly untenable. The court also recognised that Form 17.2 
is incorrectly worded and that it is incorrect to send Form 17.1 and Form 
17.2 at the same time. Unfortunately, the court then read its own time limits 
into the period within which a debt review has to be referred to court and 
seemed to address the issue of a consumer whose debt review is not 
referred to court, as envisaged in section 86(7)(c), without considering the 
exact nature of the challenge at hand. The latter pertains to consumers who 
want to withdraw from or exit the debt review process – not because their 
debt counsellors did not refer their matters to court, but because they allege 
that their financial situation has improved since going under debt review. 
The judgment in Du Toit v Sager, save for making the point that the High 
Court should not be approached to deal with matters that fall within the 
jurisdictional remit of entities like the Tribunal, also brings the issue under 
discussion no nearer to a solution. Its "three path"-approach is, with respect, 
not applicable and not appropriate for addressing the problem at hand. It 
can respectfully also not be agreed with the court in this matter that there is 
no lacuna in the NCA, in the context of the plight of consumers who wish to 
exit debt review on the basis that their financial situation has improved. 
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The Phaladi case appears to be a well-considered and well-motivated 
judgment, where the court indeed appreciated the specific nature of the 
issue at hand, even though the court did not indicate in any particular detail 
how the problem could be addressed. Binns-Ward J is clearly correct in 
indicating that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be used to 
address the problem under discussion. His remarks are also correct - that 
section 88(1)(b) neither contemplates an application to the Magistrate's 
Court for declaring an already established state of over-indebtedness to 
have come to an end, nor envisages an application to end debt review 
pursuant to an agreed debt rearrangement pursuant to a recommendation 
in terms of section 86(7)(b). One can also agree with his remarks that 
section 87(1)(a) itself does not make provision for an application, but merely 
acknowledges the power of the Magistrate's Court to refuse ("reject") such 
an application. It can be agreed that section 87(1)(a) merely provides for a 
negative response by the court to the application before it, that section 
88(1)(b) effectively cross references to section 87(1)(a), and that the NCA 
does not contemplate an application to the Magistrate's Court for a 
declaration that the consumer is not over-indebted (i.e. that the aim of the 
applications to the Magistrate's Court that the NCA provides for is actually 
to try and get the consumer declared over-indebted so that he can be 
afforded debt relief). There is arguably also merit in his view that a High 
Court cannot give the necessary declaratory relief, as contended for by the 
applicants, and that reading-in would not be an appropriate remedy. 
However, it cannot be agreed that any process catering for withdrawal from 
debt review by consumers who have entered the debt review process and 
whose financial circumstances have subsequently improved should be an 
administrative process only. Although an administrative process to guide 
such withdrawal prior to a formal declaration of over-indebtedness and prior 
to a debt restructuring order’s being made by a court may be appropriate, it 
will no longer suffice once the consumer has entered the judicial realm; 
namely, where a court has made the aforesaid declaration and order. Once 
such a declaration and order is made, withdrawal and exit will be possible 
only on application to court, supported by evidence regarding the fact that 
the consumer is no longer over-indebted and that he will be in a position to 
repay his credit agreement debt as per the original agreement terms.184 
The Eseu v Debt Safe case, given the fact that it fails to engage with the 
problem at hand at all, brings us nowhere closer to a solution. 
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It appears that the court in the Botha case also appreciated the fact that the 
restructuring proposal by a debt counsellor, absent a restructuring order by 
a court, has no legal effect (although as pointed out above, an application 
for debt review to a debt counsellor has the legal effect of barring the over-
indebted consumer from entering into new credit agreements and triggering 
a moratorium on enforcement). The court has also correctly pointed out that 
a debt counsellor is under an obligation to refer his recommendation to court 
for an order. However, it appears that the court held the view that withdrawal 
or exit from debt review, where a consumer's financial position has improved 
after he applied for debt review, can be granted only by the Magistrate's 
Court and that the appropriate section of the NCA, authorising such 
withdrawal, would be section 88(1)(b), which allows for an order that the 
consumer is "not over-indebted". However, as argued in more detail in 
paragraph 9 below, it is submitted that consumers whose financial situation 
has improved should be able to withdraw from debt review and the manner 
in which they should be able to achieve this should depend on how far the 
debt review has progressed. Accordingly, some consumers may be able to 
withdraw without having to approach a court, whereas consumers in respect 
of whom a restructuring order was granted will be able to do only so by 
approaching a court for relief.  
Although they do not indicate how the conundrum of withdrawal from the 
debt review process by consumers whose financial position has 
subsequently improved should be solved, certain important issues were 
also highlighted in the judgments in the Ntonto and Swanepoel cases. In the 
Ntonto case, the need for these type of consumers to make out a proper 
case for relief on the papers was highlighted, making it clear that consumers 
will need to prove that they are de facto no longer over-indebted. In the 
Swanepoel case, the court quite correctly rejected the notion that the High 
Court's inherent jurisdiction should be used as a basis for relief and also 
emphasised the problematic aspect relating to the fact that the High Court 
cannot merely "rescind" a debt restructuring order made by a Magistrate's 
Court unless on review or appeal. 
7  Problems experienced before the Tribunal 
Note should also be taken that some consumers whose financial situation 
had improved attempted to use section 165 of the NCA to obtain rescission 
orders from the Tribunal, to release them from debt review, in instances 
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where consensual debt re-arrangements were made consent orders in 
accordance with section 138 of the Act.185 Section 165 provides as follows: 
The Tribunal, acting of its own accord or on application by a person affected 
by a decision or order, may vary or rescind its decision or order- 
(a)  erroneously sought or granted in the absence of a party affected by it; 
(b)  in which there is ambiguity, or an obvious error or omission, but only to 
the extent of correcting that ambiguity, error or omission; or 
(c)  made or granted as a result of a mistake common to the parties to the 
proceedings. 
In Ngubane v Capitec Bank Ltd,186 the consumer brought an application to 
rescind a debt rearrangement agreement that was made a consent order by 
the Tribunal in 2014. The applicant alleged that he had received a salary 
increase and that he believed that he could, as a result thereof, afford to 
liquidate the debt "on his own terms". However, the Tribunal held that the 
requirements stipulated in section 165 found no application to the 
consumer's request. Consequently, the debt rearrangement order could not 
be rescinded based on the grounds advanced by the consumer due to 
section 165 not providing for the rescission of a Tribunal order in instances 
where the circumstances of the consumer changes. 
In Langa v Lewis,187 the applicant wanted the Tribunal to rescind a debt 
rearrangement consent order as she alleged (apparently without providing 
evidence) that her financial situation had "dramatically" improved since the 
order was made, and that she was now able to pay all her creditors. 
However, the Tribunal refused the application as it found that none of the 
requirements of section 165 had been met.  
In Nikiwe v Lewis,188 the applicant also applied to have a consent order 
rescinded so that he could exit the debt review process. The Tribunal stated 
that it was clear from the evidence presented that the reason the Applicant 
wanted the consent order rescinded was because he was paying his 
creditors through a debit order and also because the consent order was 
preventing the Applicant from being considered for a housing allowance of 
                                            
185  Although civil courts also have jurisdiction in terms of s 138 of the Act to grant 
consent orders, it appears that these orders are as a general rule obtained through 
the Tribunal. 
186  Ngubane v Capitec Bank Ltd 2017 JOL 37651 (NCT). 
187  Langa v Lewis (NCT) (unreported Tribunal judgment) case number 
NCT/84265/2017/165(1) of 11 September 2017. 
188  Nikiwe v Lewis (NCT) (unreported Tribunal judgment) case number 
NCT/86875/2017/165 of 22 December 2017 (hereafter the Nikiwe case). 
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some kind.189 However, the Tribunal refused to rescind the consent order, 
because it held that the application did not meet any of the requirements of 
section 165. 
In Gxarisa v Gardner,190 the applicants who wanted a consensual debt 
rearrangement order rescinded indicated that they were unable to enter into 
any credit agreement, even though they were financially sound, having 
settled "some" of their debts. In particular, it was indicated that the first 
applicant was a member of a taxi association and was experiencing 
difficulties in purchasing any vehicles and in growing his business due to 
being under debt review.191 The applicants also submitted that, when they 
entered into the debt review arrangement, the debt counsellor informed 
them that they could "opt out" of the process once they were no longer over-
indebted. During the hearing the first applicant submitted that the consent 
order had been granted as a result of a mistake common to all the parties 
in that the advice that the applicants had received had not been accurate. 
The first applicant referred the Tribunal to a form that the said debt 
counsellor asked them to sign, which, among others, contained the following 
bullet point:192 
You can choose to voluntarily withdraw from the process before repayment 
proposals (Form17.2) have been sent out OR if you can prove you are no 
longer over-indebted. 
The Tribunal indicated that the consumer had not tendered any evidence 
that showed that the debt counsellor made a mistake in applying for the 
consent order or that the credit providers made a mistake in accepting the 
debt rearrangement proposal or that the Tribunal committed any mistake by 
granting the order. It stated that, while the applicants may have 
misunderstood the debt re-arrangement process or believed that once they 
were no longer over-indebted they could apply for the consent order to be 
rescinded, the applicants' misapprehension of the consequences of the debt 
review process did not constitute a ground for rescinding the order.193 
8  Conclusion and recommendations 
From the aforementioned, it appears that those consumers whose financial 
position have improved since they entered the debt review process and who 
                                            
189  Nikiwe case para 24. 
190  Gxarisa v Gardner (NCT) (unreported Tribunal judgement) case number 
NCT/121006/2018/165 of 14 February 2019 (hereafter the Gxarisa case). 
191  Gxarisa case para 11. 
192  Gxarisa case para 12. 
193  Gxarisa case paras 24-25. 
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wish to withdraw from or exit debt review before they have completed the 
process and qualified for a clearance certificate as envisaged by section 71 
are without recourse. It further appears that, although some of the cases 
that have dealt with the issue provided insight into the scope of the intricacy 
of the matter at hand (especially the Phaladi case), many of them failed to 
appropriately identify and address the relevant issues. The point is therefore 
that none of the cases thus far offers a holistic, suitable solution to the issue 
under discussion. Consequently, it may be asked whether it is necessary 
that this issue should be resolved at all, and if so, how? 
Although this is probably unintended, the reality is that the NCA does not 
make provision for exit from debt review by consumers whose financial 
position has improved since they entered the debt review process other than 
as per section 71. No express provisions exist in this regard and although it 
may be argued, as in paragraph 6 above, that it would in principle be 
possible for these consumers to exit the voluntary debt review process 
before a formal declaration of over-indebtedness and debt restructuring 
order by the Magistrate's Court, the lack of due process to facilitate such an 
exit is unfortunate and the cause of much confusion. The same can be said 
about the lack of process to facilitate a withdrawal and exit from debt review 
after the granting of a debt restructuring order (including a debt 
rearrangement consent order in terms of section 138), but prior to meeting 
the requirements of section 71. 
The question is whether, as a matter of principle, these "unfortunate" 
consumers should be able to withdraw from debt review before they meet 
the requirements of section 71. Would allowing for such withdrawal and exit 
erode the mechanism of debt review, which was devised to assist over-
indebted consumers with debt relief and to enable credit providers to obtain 
the eventual satisfaction of (restructured) credit agreement debts? What 
prejudice would result from allowing consumers, whose financial position 
has improved since they applied for debt review but before they meet the 
requirements of section 71, to withdraw from and exit the process? 
A number of features of the debt review process may assist in addressing 
this conundrum. First, as pointed out, the debt review process is a voluntary 
process – at least until it is formalised by a formal declaration of over-
indebtedness and debt restructuring order by the court. Second, as 
indicated in paragraph 2 above, it is a process that requires good faith 
participation. Third, it generates effects that serve to protect both consumers 
(the moratorium against enforcement and the extended repayment period) 
and credit providers (the bar against entry into further credit agreements, 
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which may compromise the credit provider's ability to obtain payment, and 
the creation of a streamlined process for obtaining eventual satisfaction of 
debt). Of course, the bar against entry into further credit agreements also 
protects the consumer from falling prey to reckless credit, due to a lack of 
affordability (as envisaged in section 80(b)(ii)), but it also renders these 
consumers more vulnerable, because they are unable to access credit to 
meet certain needs that may inevitably arise in the course of their daily lives. 
It appears from the case law that the fact that consumers are subject to the 
debt review procedure even compromises their ability to obtain jobs and 
enter into lease agreements. Nevertheless, it is submitted that all these 
measures make perfect sense when applied to try and assist a consumer 
who is over-indebted. However, the question is whether the mere fact that 
a consumer was over-indebted at one stage in his life and voluntarily chose 
to enter into a process devised to assist in managing and overcoming such 
over-indebtedness should be shackled by this process and its limitations on 
his contractual capacity, even if he subsequently, prior to the completion of 
the process, reaches a stage where his financial situation has improved to 
such an extent that he is de facto no longer over-indebted. 
Some may be of the opinion that if the financial position of over-indebted 
consumers who entered debt review improves during the course of a debt 
review, they must just go ahead and pay up their restructured debts and 
consequently obtain their clearance certificates. However, one must bear in 
mind that it may not necessarily be that these consumers' situations have 
improved to such an extent that they are able to pay their debts in one go, 
but rather that they are able to resume their original contractual repayments. 
Bearing in mind that debt review is a procedure devised to provide relief to 
over-indebted consumers, it could clearly not have been the intention of the 
legislature to trap into the debt review process consumers whose financial 
positions have improved, since entering into the process. The legislature 
was probably so preoccupied with the unfortunate lot of over-indebted 
consumers that the fact that their position could improve prior to meeting 
the section 71 requirements did not cross its mind. The absurdity of keeping 
an over-indebted consumer whose financial situation improved trapped in 
the debt review process, with its limitation on entering into new credit 
agreements, is glaringly obvious and goes against the grain of the NCA and 
its attempts to protect consumers. Allowing consumers whose financial 
positions have adequately improved to withdraw from and exit the debt 
review process – if properly regulated – would also not prejudice credit 
providers. This is because such credit providers would then be able to 
obtain payments in accordance with the original agreement, which 
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payments would obviously be larger than those for which the terms of 
restructuring provide. Also, payments would be made over a shorter period 
than with the debt restructuring term, without compromising the credit 
providers' entitlement to interest. At worst, if such consumers default, credit 
providers will be able to enforce the agreements, because there would be 
no moratorium on enforcement. Having regard to the cases mentioned 
above, it is notable that they were apparently all unopposed, which may be 
construed as pointing to the fact that credit providers do not regard 
themselves as being unduly prejudiced should a consumer whose financial 
position has improved be allowed to exit the debt review process. 
As submitted in paragraph 6 above, the Act itself poses no impediment to a 
consumer whose financial position has improved withdrawing from the 
process prior to a formal declaration of over-indebtedness by the court, 
albeit the lack of an appropriate procedure to cater for this is unsatisfactory. 
However, once a declaration of over-indebtedness and a debt restructuring 
order is in place, the voluntary debt review process assumes a compulsory 
character and, as has been pointed out, neither the NCA nor the 
Magistrates' Courts Act nor the Superior Courts Act contains any provisions 
that could facilitate a withdrawal or exit on the basis of an improved financial 
position (absent meeting the requirements of section 71). 
It is submitted that bona fide consumers who can prove that their financial 
position has de facto improved should be assisted by an amendment to the 
NCA to specifically cater for such a situation. This should be the position, 
regardless of whether consumers' financial positions improve prior to or 
after a debt restructuring order was made. In other words, such consumers 
should be allowed to withdraw from and exit the debt review process on the 
basis of being able to prove that they are no longer over-indebted and not 
depending on whether the debt review process has been formalised and 
acquired a compulsory nature by virtue of a debt restructuring order or not. 
What is clearly necessary is a legislative process that facilitates this 
withdrawal, because the lack of due process only exacerbates the prevailing 
confusion and, as we have seen, results in wasted high court costs for many 
consumers. Given the important role that good faith plays in the debt review 
process, it is submitted that this withdrawal process should also hinge on 
good faith filters and should require clear proof that the consumer's financial 
position has indeed improved to such an extent that he is no longer over-
indebted and that he can resume his normal payments as originally 
contractually agreed. It could also contain a provision catering for the 
payment of debt counselling and legal fees, to the extent that these fees are 
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not disputed. This will result in only eligible bona fide consumers being able 
to withdraw from debt review and to resume the payment of credit 
agreement debt in a manner that would be to the advantage of credit 
providers. 
How exactly should the NCA be amended to cater for this intervention? 
Given that these consumers, although not over-indebted anymore, do not 
meet the requirements for a clearance certificate, section 71 might not be 
the correct section to amend. Because section 86 itself provides an 
opportunity for credit providers to terminate a debt review in certain 
circumstances, it would arguably be prudent to amend section 86 to also 
allow consumers to withdraw from debt review in good faith if they can 
provide proof that their financial position has improved to such an extent 
that they can repay their debts in accordance with the original contractual 
terms. Provision can then be made for a specific procedure for withdrawal 
prior to the granting of a debt restructuring order as well as for a procedure 
that allows for withdrawal after a debt restructuring order. In the latter 
respect, the provision should cater for a declaration by the Magistrate's 
Court that the consumer is not over-indebted and should authorise (as a lex 
specialis) the setting aside of the debt restructuring order. It appears to be 
settled that where a lex specialis provides for the rescission of a court order 
on grounds other than those mentioned in section 36 of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act, it would not be necessary to amend section 36 to cater 
specifically for withdrawal in terms of the (suggested) amended section 86 
of the NCA. Very importantly, where a debt restructuring or rearrangement 
order has already been made, it is necessary to keep the withdrawal 
process in the Magistrate's Courts (and insofar as consent orders are 
concerned in the Tribunal), because these institutions deal with debt 
reviews on a daily basis and are particularly suited, also cost-wise, to deal 
with withdrawals from debt review which occur after debt restructuring 
orders have been made. 
It would then also be necessary to consequentially amend section 88(1) and 
(3). Section 165 of the Act would also have to be amended to allow for the 
rescission of a rearrangement order made by consent by the Tribunal to the 
effect that such an order can be rescinded under the circumstances relating 
to withdrawal from the debt review process, as set out in the section 86 
amendments proposed above. 
Another issue that seems to have added to the complications experienced 
by consumers whose financial positions have improved since entering into 
debt review can be traced back to the fact that (as pointed out in Less v 
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Vosloo) in many instances debt counsellors have failed to observe their duty 
to follow the procedure set out in section 86, and have instead allowed many 
debt reviews to operate on an informal basis, outside the process mandated 
by section 86. This lack of conformity by debt counsellors with their statutory 
duties should be dealt with by the NCR, who should at least send out a 
circular to debt counsellors indicating that such non-compliance would be 
investigated and referred to the Tribunal and could result in suspension or 
cancellation of the debt counsellor's registration. In addition, it appears that 
the fact that the content of Form 17.2 is not aligned with the provisions of 
the Act and regulations may have also contributed to the confusion. Hence, 
it is also necessary to revisit this form.  
Finally, it may also be that the Debt Help System operated by the NCR is 
not adequately designed or rigged to facilitate withdrawal from debt review, 
as argued for in this contribution. However, if such a problem exists, the way 
to deal with it is simple: the Debt Help System cannot be allowed to 
compromise the position of consumers who are no longer over-indebted 
because their financial position has improved. Thus, the system will need to 
be tweaked or updated to facilitate the intended group's withdrawal in the 
circumstances contended for in this contribution. 
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